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Abstract 
 
Customer referencing refers to the phenomenon that a firm intentionally reveals its 
connections to customers to raise its own reputation. In this paper, we rely on textual data 
about customer referencing in financial reports to examine the association between customer 
referencing and firms’ future product market performance. We first document that a 
substantial number of firms voluntarily reference customers in financial reports. We find that 
these firms have a better future performance, consistent with the notion that the customers 
being referenced certify product quality and enhance a firm’s reputation. We also find that the 
positive association is stronger for firms with a low reputation and those that are risky or 
facing high product market competition. These results further affirm the product quality 
certification and reputation enhancement roles of customer referencing. Our study provides 
new insight into how certification via inter-organizational relationships can be an intangible 
marketing asset.  
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1. Introduction 
Both individuals and corporations tend to enhance their own profiles by disclosing the 
names of related parties. In the context of marketing, customer referencing is an important 
and pervasive phenomenon in product market practices. It refers to a company strategically 
disclosing its connection to customers, either in private or public communications, to 
demonstrate the credibility and attractiveness of its products or services (Salminen, 1997; 
Salminen and Möller, 2004, 2006). Customer information is one of firms’ most important 
intangible assets (Srivastava et al., 1998; Gupta and Lehmann, 2003). How firms rely on 
customer information to influence product market outcomes is an interesting and important 
question. However, to date no studies have provided any large-sample evidence on how the 
use of customer information affect a firm’s product market performance. One possible reason 
is that customer referencing occurs through various avenues, such as websites, posters, 
reference lists/programs, press releases, articles in trade journals, promotional seminars, or 
even in private communication between the firm and its potential and existing customers. 
This makes it difficult to systematically obtain comparable data across different platforms to 
conduct a comprehensive study, including cross-sectional analyses based on product market 
features, of the relation between customer referencing and product market outcomes.1 
In this study, we use firm-level textual data on customer referencing in financial reports 
as a proxy for firms’ propensity for the practice. 2 According to the requirements of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
                                                             
1 Examples of customer referencing can be found on the websites of large firms, including IT firms such as 
Microsoft, Dell, IBM, SAP and Sun Microsystems; industrial technology providers such as ABB; and service 
providers such as Eaton. An example of Microsoft’s Customer Reference Program can be found at: 
https://www.microsoft.com/hk/casestudies/. Appendix A provides examples of referencing via websites and 
other channels.  
2 The use of textual data to measure firm-specific conditions, especially when the conditions are difficult to 
proxy for using traditional techniques, has become increasingly common in the literature. For example, Li, 
Lundholm and Minnis (2012) develop a measure of competition based on management's disclosures in their 10-
K filings and find that firms’ rates of diminishing marginal returns on new and existing investment vary 
significantly with their measure. While admittedly noisy, the measures the paper develops permit the study of 
interesting economic phenomena.  
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(FASB), firms must disclose major customers if their purchase amount accounts for 10% or 
more of the firm’s total annual sales. However, while the disclosure of major customer 
information is driven by compliance, a significant number of firms voluntarily disclose 
customer information even if sales to these customers do not reach the cutoff. In this paper, 
we employ the customer information voluntarily disclosed in financial reports to proxy for 
firms’ propensity for customer referencing, and then to investigate how customer referencing 
affects firms’ product markets and financial performance. In addition to allowing for 
systematic (and replicable) data collection, another advantage of using the customer 
disclosure in financial reports to study customer referencing is that the data is available for 
1976 onwards. Appendix B provides an illustration of such disclosure in financial reports. 
The hypothesis on the product market effect of customer referencing is not without 
tension. On the one hand, under the proprietary cost argument, when a firm discloses 
information about its customers, competitors can scrutinize the information and determine 
whether they can use it to gain their competitive advantage in their product market. For 
example, competitors may induce the disclosed customers to switch to them. The potential 
loss of customers, as well as the costs of retaining customers (e.g., lower prices, higher 
marketing expenses and more customer support) can adversely affect a firm’s future 
performance (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000; Esteves, 2009; Naumann et al., 2010). In 
addition to competitors’ actions, customer referencing could drive away customers that prefer 
privacy. For example, a customer may wish to avoid being disclosed due to possible adverse 
information spillover effects, should the firm face difficulties (Chen et al., 2013; Cen et al., 
2014). Hence, proprietary costs channel predicts a negative effect for customer disclosure on 
firm performance. 
On the other hand, customer referencing may lead to a better future performance due to 
customer certification of a firm’s quality. First, current customer contracts can serve to certify 
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a firm’s product or service quality and properties by showing that it has successfully passed 
through current customers’ selection process, which help it attract sales and decrease 
expenses such as marketing expenses and input costs from its suppliers. For example, the 
prior marketing literature finds that firms use current customers as references to reduce 
potential buyers’ perceived risks, uncertainty and searching costs and to gain a competitive 
advantage over its competitors (e.g., Salminen and Möller, 2004, 2006; Jalkala and Salminen, 
2010; Ruokolainen and Aarikka-Stenroos, 2016).3 In addition, current customers also certify 
a firm’s ability to fulfill implicit claims, such as after-sales service, a continuing supply of 
products and the long-term availability of product components, which are important 
considerations in making purchase decisions (Telser, 1980; Klein and Leffler, 1981; Bull, 
1987). Second, given the importance of sales to firms’ financial performance, current 
customers can signal a firm’s ability to fulfill the claims of a broad array of stakeholders. 
Contracts with customers, especially reputable ones, indicate that a firm can receive 
sustainable cash flow and thereby make timely payments to suppliers, lenders and employees. 
As a result, suppliers and lenders might be willing to offer better credit terms, and employees 
might require a smaller compensating wage differential. Hence, the certification channel 
predicts that customer referencing will have a positive effect on future firm performance. 
In analyzing the customer disclosure data from 1976 to 2016, we find evidence 
consistent with the certification channel. Specifically, after controlling for firm and year fixed 
effects and other firm characteristics, we find that firms that reference customers have 
significantly higher asset turnover in the following year. These firms also report a higher 
gross margin and spend less on selling, general and administration (SGA) expenses per dollar 
of sales. In general, these firms experience better overall performance in terms of their return 
on assets (ROA). As for economic significance, these firms have asset turnover, gross margin 
                                                             
3 Appendix A provides some real-world examples of firms using customers as a reference to attract new buyers. 
For example, Microsoft Hong Kong Limited provides information about Hong Kong customers on its website. 
SAP reveals its customers in airport posters ads and its conference presentations.  
4 
 
and ROA that are higher by 1.9%, 2.5% and 1.1%, respectively, and an SGA-to-sales ratio 
that is lower by 1.3%.  
We conduct some robustness analyses. First, we develop alternative measures of 
customer referencing such as counting the number of customers referenced and whether the 
firm has referenced at least one customer with a non-trivial sales contribution. Our results are 
robust to these alternative proxies. Since customer reputation determines how much of an 
impact referencing has on firm performance, we also construct measures of customer 
referencing that consider the reputation of the customers being referenced. In the baseline 
regressions, we use industry-adjusted dependent variables because performance ratios are 
highly industry-dependent and may be affected by extraneous industry shocks. We repeat the 
analyses using non-industry-adjusted measures and find qualitatively similar results. 
Furthermore, we demonstrate that our main findings are robust to the use of the instrumental 
variable approach to mitigate endogeneity concerns.  
To gain further insight into the certification channel, we run several cross-sectional 
analyses to examine how the association between customer referencing and future 
performance varies across different firms. First, we investigate whether the effect of customer 
referencing on future performance varies with a firm’s own reputation. When potential buyers 
and suppliers are uncertain about cooperating with a firm that has a low or an unestablished 
reputation in the product market, the firm can gain reputation transfer from its customers 
(Helm and Salminen, 2010; Jalkala and Salminen, 2010). For example, this strategic 
reputation transfer from high to low reputation partners is widely used in marketing activities 
like co-branding, ingredient-branding and sponsorships (Norris, 1992; Rao et al., 1999; Wally 
and Hurley, 1998; Bengtsson and Servais, 2005). Consistent with a greater reputation 
spillover to firms that need a reputation boost, we find evidence that customer referencing 
leads to an even better performance when a firm’s reputation is low.  
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Next, we investigate how the disclosure of customer information influences riskier firms’ 
future performance. Suppliers of riskier firms face a high default risk. Customers also have 
concerns about such firms’ ability to perform implicit claims and avoid supply disruption, 
which may lead to substantial costs for customers (e.g., Chopra and Sodhi, 2004; Tomlin, 
2006). Therefore, riskier firms have a greater need to show evidence of their competence, 
thereby providing reassurance to potential buyers and suppliers. Consistent with our 
expectation, we find that the positive effect of customer referencing on future firm 
performance is stronger for risker firms.  
Finally, we investigate the effect of customer referencing on the future performance of 
firms with high product market competition. Firms with more competition need to 
differentiate themselves more to achieve a better performance than their industry peers and 
signaling customers’ high reputation is one important way of doing so (Irvine and Pontiff, 
2008; Hoberg et al., 2014; Kubick et al., 2015; Booth and Zhou, 2015). Consistent with 
expectation, we find that the effect of customer referencing on performance is stronger 
among firms that face high competition. 
Our study makes several contributions. First, we contribute to research on inter-
organizational relationships as a source of firm value (e.g., Amir and Lev, 1996; Lev, 2001; 
Fee and Thomas, 2004; Patatoukas, 2012). The results in our paper suggest that current 
customers are more than just current and future income sources. The presence of customers 
can also be an intangible asset, specifically, a valuable marketing tool that can promote future 
purchases by the firm’s potential and existing customers, which, in turn, improves the firm’s 
performance (Ruokolainen and Igel, 2004; Tomas Gomez-Arias and Montermoso, 2007; 
Ruokolainen and Aarikka-Stenroos, 2016). To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the 
first to provide large-sample, multi-faceted analyses of the link between customer referencing 
and firm performance, as well as how the link varies in the cross-section with important firm 
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characteristics such as the extent of the competition in its product market. 
Second, our findings also add to the evolving literature on limited attention to inter-firm 
links (e.g., Cohen and Frazzini, 2008; Madsen, 2017). Although customer referencing is 
common in practice, there has been limited large-sample, in-depth analysis of this issue. In 
this paper, we do so by relying on a data technique that is increasing common in the 
literature: the use of textual data to construct proxies for large samples of firms. Thus our 
paper also contributes to the literature on the disclosure of customers in financial reports that 
focuses on the mandated disclosure of information about major customers (e.g., Hertzel et al., 
2008; Pandit et al., 2011; Ellis et al., 2012; Li et al., 2018). Our work complements and 
contrasts with this research by focusing on the voluntary disclosure of information about non-
major customers and examining the link between customer referencing and product market 
benefits.  
Finally, our study contributes to the information spillover literature. The prior literature 
finds that information from a firm’s disclosure has externalities and influences other firms 
(Foster, 1981; Han and Wild, 1990; Freeman and Tse, 1992; Pandit et al., 2011; Badertscher 
et al., 2013). We document a special type of information spillover in which the customer’s 
reputation spills over to the firm and provides it with certification. An interesting finding in 
our paper is that the reputation spillover from customers is greater if the firm itself is not of 
high reputation.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews prior literature and 
develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and research design. Section 4 reports 
the main findings and robustness tests. Section 5 covers some cross-sectional analyses and 
Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
Customer referencing refers to the phenomenon of firms intentionally disclosing their 
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relationships with current customers to provide concrete, practical evidence of their products’ 
creditability (Salminen, 1997; Salminen and Möller, 2004, 2006). It is a common marketing 
practice. For example, Microsoft, who provides descriptions of its business with key 
customers on its website, describes its relationship with Uber as follows: “Millions of people 
worldwide have embraced Uber as a new means of reliable transportation and flexible 
income. To safeguard against fraud and enhance both driver and rider peace of mind, Uber 
uses the Face API, part of Microsoft Cognitive Services, to help ensure the driver using the 
app matches the account on file. The extra verification step is fast, works on all smartphones 
and in dim light, and scales to more than 1 million driver-partners. By using the Face API, 
Uber saved months of development work, time it could devote to tailoring the user 
experience.”4 Other real-life examples of customer referencing can be easily found on the 
website of many other large firms. The marketing materials of many companies, such as 
advertisements and brochures, also commonly mention their customers’ names, especially 
their more reputable customers. Even universities engage in referencing by highlighting their 
more prominent alumni on their websites and in other marketing outlets. 
However, the association between customer referencing and future performance is 
unclear. Customer information is viewed as proprietary, thus disclosing it can bring costs to a 
firm. Ellis et al. (2012) and Li et al. (2018) find that firms are unwilling to reveal customer 
names when the proprietary cost is high. Under the proprietary cost argument, when a firm 
discloses information about its customer lists and its sales amounts to those customers, 
competitors may scrutinize this information and develop competitive strategies (e.g., offering 
a lower price) to compete with the firm. A customer may change its supplier if a competitor 
offers a better price (Naumann et al., 2010). Not surprisingly, losing customers adversely 
affects the firm’s sales. Competitors’ actions, such as more aggressive attempts to attract the 
                                                             
4 https://customers.microsoft.com/en-us/story/uber. 
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firm’s existing customers (Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000; Esteves, 2009), might also increase 
the firm’s costs of retaining these customers (e.g., marketing expenses).  
Even without competitor’s actions, firms’ disclosure choice could drive away customers 
that prefer privacy. For example, a customer may wish to avoid being disclosed due to 
potential spillover effects, especially when supplier firms are subject to crises, scandals or 
lawsuits. Prior literature finds that suppliers in trouble have an adverse impact on customers 
(e.g., Chen et al., 2013; Cen et al., 2014). Existing and potential buyers that do not want to be 
disclosed would avoid doing business with firms that tend to disclose customer information, 
leading to these firms’ decreased future performance. Accordingly, the proprietary cost 
channel predicts that firm performance would be negatively affected by customer referencing. 
In contrast, a firm that references customers may have a better future performance due to 
the certification role of the referenced customers. First, current customer contracts serve to 
certify the firm’s product or service quality. It is widely accepted that customer-base 
information is among firms’ most important intangible assets (Srivastava et al., 1998; Gupta 
and Lehmann, 2003). Firms that provide service, have constantly evolving product lines, 
launch new products or enter new markets may have to confront potential buyers’ significant 
credibility concerns about product or service quality (Ruokolainen and Igel, 2004; 
Ruokolainen and Aarikka-Stenroos, 2016). Such firms face significant difficulties in 
attracting purchases and charging high prices for their products. Advertising and promotion 
activities are among the ways to gain customers’ attention and ease their concerns. However, 
current customers that have purchased and successfully used a firm’s product (or service) 
potentially offers more concrete evidence of the product quality. While evidence of 
competence presented in a firm’s own advertising may be viewed as biased, evidence 
provided via customer reference is seen as more independent because it is from third party. 
Using case studies and surveys, prior literature shows that firms use their current customers 
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as references to reduce potential buyers’ perceived risks, uncertainty and searching costs and 
to gain a competitive advantage over competitors (Salminen, 1997; Salminen and Möller, 
2004, 2006; Ruokolainen and Igel, 2004; Jalkala and Salminen, 2010; Ruokolainen and 
Aarikka-Stenroos, 2016). Therefore, because of customers’ certification effects, firms are able 
to attract more new customers while decreasing advertising and promotional expenses. 
Second, contracts with current customers also certify a firm’s reputation in fulfilling 
stakeholders’ implicit claims. From the perspective of a firm’s suppliers, whether they will 
provide favorable pricing and other contract terms to the firm depends on its reputation for 
honoring implicit claims, such as timely payment, a commitment to continuing demand for a 
product or service, a specified image for a product or service (Bowen et al., 1995; Costello, 
2013). From the perspective of customers, implicit claims such as after-sales service, a 
continuing supply of products and the long-term availability of product components are 
among potential buyers’ important considerations in making a purchase decision (Telser, 
1980; Klein and Leffler, 1981; Bull, 1987). By revealing a contract with a customer, 
especially a reputable one, a firm signals that it is well able to effectively maintain 
cooperation with stakeholders and that it has stable cash inflows needed to make timely 
payments to suppliers. Accordingly, the firm’s suppliers are more willing to provide favorable 
pricing and other terms that decrease its input costs and potential buyers are also more willing 
to purchase (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Roberts and Dowling, 2002; Shamsie, 2003). 
Accordingly, the customer certification channel predicts a positive relation between customer 
referencing and firm performance. 
Given the tension in the hypothesis, it is an empirical question as to whether customer 
referencing helps firms improve future performance. We expect to observe a positive 
(negative) relation between customer referencing and future performance under the 
certification (proprietary cost) channel. Although there is tension underlying this research 
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question, we predict, on balance, that firms are likely to have rational expectations that they 
will achieve better product market performance when they reference customers, especially 
since they have discretion over whether or not to engage in customer referencing and then in 
terms of which specific customers to disclose. Formally, we state this hypothesis as follows: 
H1: Firms that reference customers have a better future performance than those that do not. 
New customers and suppliers may be more uncertain about firms that have a low 
reputation in the product market. Therefore, such firms can gain reputation transfer from their 
current customers (Helm and Salminen, 2010; Jalkala and Salminen, 2010). Helm and 
Salminen (2010) propose that the worse a firm’s reputation is in its own market or among its 
stakeholders, the more favorable the reputation transfer effect via current customers’ 
disclosure will be. Such a strategic reputation transfer from high to low reputation partners is 
also widely used in marketing activities like co-branding, ingredient-branding, and 
sponsorships (Norris, 1992; Rao et al., 1999; Wally and Hurley, 1998; Bengtsson and Servais, 
2005). For example, Rao et al. (1999) find that the market acceptance for a new product by a 
low reputation firm is higher when it is co-branded with a high reputation brand. Falkenreck 
(2009) also finds that using reputation transfer makes it easier for a firm to enter a new 
market in which it is unknown. Based on the certification channel, low reputation firms are 
more likely to benefit from customer referencing. Therefore, we expect the association 
between customer referencing and future performance to be stronger for low reputation firms. 
We state this hypothesis as follows: 
H2: The effect of customer referencing on future performance is stronger among low 
reputation firms. 
Riskier firms are usually unattractive to customers due to supply continuity concerns. 
Supply disruption risk is an important customer consideration, especially for industrial 
customers (e.g., Chopra and Sodhi, 2004; Tomlin, 2006), because supply disruption may 
11 
 
induce huge losses for the customer, such as production disruption loss and sales loss. In 
addition, riskier firms are also unattractive to suppliers because they have a high probability 
of default. Therefore, riskier firms have a greater need to offer evidence of their ability to 
maintain supply continuity and meet payment commitments, thus providing reassurance to 
potential customers and suppliers. Based on the certification channel, firms signal their ability 
by showing that they have successfully passed through their current customers’ selection 
process. Hence, we expect that the association between customer referencing and future 
performance is stronger for riskier firms. This hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H3: The effect of customer referencing on future performance is stronger for riskier firms. 
Firms constantly interact with peer firms in the same industry competing for the same 
customers and struggling for market share. Firms that face high product market competition 
have more difficulties differentiating themselves from their competitors, so they are less 
likely to earn high abnormal profits and have persistent profitability and cash flow (Irvine and 
Pontiff, 2008; Hoberg et al., 2014; Kubick et al., 2015; Booth and Zhou, 2015). Such firms 
are also less likely to have a high market share in the industry because customers can easily 
switch to their competitors. Furthermore, suppliers may also have concerns about such firms’ 
commitment to timely payment and continuing demand. Therefore, they have a greater need 
to offer evidence of their products’ quality or their ability to fulfill stakeholders’ implicit 
claims, thereby differentiating themselves from their competitors. Based on the certification 
channel, the customers being referenced can significantly help such firms stand out from their 
competitors by certifying the firms’ quality and other abilities. Hence, we expect the effect of 
customer referencing on future performance to be more pronounced for firms facing high 
product market competition. We state our last hypothesis as follows: 
H4: The effect of customer referencing on future performance is stronger for firms that face 
high product market competition. 
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3. Data and research design  
3.1 Sample selection 
3.1.1 Measure of customer referencing using firm-year-customer data 
We start by using data on the disclosure of customer information in the Compustat 
Segment Files from 1976 to 2016. While these files contain data about major customers, 
which firms disclose per SEC and FASB requirements, they also include information about 
non-major customers (Ellis et al., 2012). The files provide information about customers’ 
names, the dollar amount of purchases and the customer type (e.g., company and geographic 
region). We first remove non-company customers because the focus of our paper is on 
referencing specific customers. In addition, many of our analyses require more information 
about the customers (e.g., customer reputation) and such information is only available for and 
comparable across company customers. 5 This sample restriction decreases the number of 
firm-year-customer observations from 508,827 to 298,081. To differentiate between 
mandatorily and voluntarily disclosed customers, we calculate the sales contribution ratio for 
each customer by dividing the sales to a customer by the firm’s annual sales. Following Ellis 
et al. (2012), customers with a contribution ratio equal to or greater than the 10% threshold 
are classified as mandatorily disclosed customers. Customers that fall below that threshold 
are treated as voluntarily disclosed.6 
Figure 1 presents the fraction of customers that have been voluntarily or mandatorily 
disclosed from 1976 to 2016, as reported in the Compustat Customer Segment Files. The x-
axis and the y-axis indicate the sales contribution and fraction of customers, respectively. 
                                                             
5 The database broadly records four types of customer information, i.e., company (59%), geographic region 
(19%), market (15%) and governments (7%).  
6 Among the 298,081 firm-year-customer observations, around 18% are missing the dollar amount of purchase. 
We treat those cases as voluntary disclosures, as the mandatory disclosure rule requires the firm to disclose this 
information (many firms disclose the percentage of sales to the customer and the database records the data by 
translating the percentage into a dollar amount). In other words, we reasonably assume that missing values are 
primarily due to a firm’s voluntary choice to not disclose their customers’ purchase amounts. Our results are 
robust if we drop observations with missing purchase data. 
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Specifically, a customer’s sales contribution ratio is the sales to the customer divided by the 
firm’s total sales in a year. The height of each bar represents the percentage of total customers 
that are within a specific interval of the contribution ratio. The width of each bar is 1%. For 
example, the highest bar shows that approximately 7% of total customers have a sales 
contribution of 10%-11%. In the figure, we do not show customers with a sales contribution 
ratio of greater than 41% so that we can focus on the region around and below the 10% 
threshold, which separates mandatorily from voluntarily disclosed customers.  
The first ten bars relate to voluntarily disclosed customers. If firms only disclose major 
customers, as mandated, we would expect the height of these bars to be zero. The figure 
shows that this is clearly not the case. For example, approximately 6% of total customers 
contribute less than 2% to the firm’s annual sales (i.e., aggregating the first and second bars). 
Since so many customers are voluntarily disclosed, it seems reasonable to suspect that at least 
some of the disclosing firms have strategic reasons for doing so. It is this phenomenon that 
motivates us to use the voluntarily disclosed customer information as a proxy for a firm’s 
customer referencing propensity.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Using the above firm-year-customer observations, we construct our firm-year indicator 
variable of customer referencing, CUS_REF. We consider a firm to have engaged in customer 
referencing in a particular year if it discloses at least one customer that satisfies all of the 
following three conditions: i) the customer is disclosed with a specific company name; ii) the 
customer contributes less than 10% to the firm’s current annual sales, i.e., the customer is a 
non-major customer; iii) the customer is not a major customer for the previous year. The first 
condition is a necessary one for customer referencing, which essentially means a firm’s 
disclosure of the names of customers to boost its own profile. The second and third 
conditions are to capture the discretionary use of customer referencing by the firm. 
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Specifically, the second condition is imposed because the disclosure of major customers is 
mandated. The third condition excludes cases where the firm is providing some sales updates 
about a previously disclosed major customer and any attempts at customer referencing are 
limited, at best. In sum, using the data from the Compustat Segment Files, we construct a 
dataset based on whether or not a firm in a particular year has engaged in customer 
referencing. 
3.1.2 Sample of firm-year observations 
We then merge our firm-year data on CUS_REF with firm-year observations from the 
Compustat Annual File to construct other variables. These variables include various measures 
of financial performance that we use as our dependent variables and a set of control variables. 
Following prior literature, we exclude utilities (SIC 4900–4999) and financial firms (SIC 
6000–6999). To execute a comprehensive regression analysis, we only retain firm-year 
observations with no missing values to construct all dependent and control variables in our 
main regression analysis (see equation 1 below). After the above procedures, we have a final 
sample of 98,781 firm-year observations from 1976 to 2016. We summarize the sample 
selection process in Table 1, Panel A. 
Table 1, Panel B tabulates the industry distribution of the sample. While firms in the 
manufacturing and services industries account for 77% of our total sample, the percentage of 
firms that engage in customer referencing is relatively similar across different industries, 
ranging from 19% to 27%.  
 [Insert Table 1 here]  
3.2 Empirical methodology 
We use the following model specification to examine the relation between firms’ 
customer referencing propensity and their future performance, particularly their product 
market performance: 
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Performance =β0+β1CUS_REF +β2MAJ_CUS +β3CUS_CON  
+β4SGRW +β5SIZE +β6LEV +β7CASH +β8TANGI +β9SEG +β10AGE                      
+β11SGA +Firm Fixed Effects +Year Fixed Effects+ε .                     (1) 
In equation (1), the unit of analysis is the firm-year observation. All independent 
variables are characteristics of firm i calculated in year t and the dependent variable is the 
performance of firm i measured in year t+1. 7  Specifically, the dependent variable, 
Performance, is one of four industry-adjusted measures of operating performance in the next 
year: asset turnover (ATO), gross margin (GM), SG&A expenses-to-sales (SGA) and return on 
assets (ROA). ATO is the ratio of sales to beginning-of-year total assets adjusted by industry 
mean asset turnover. GM is measured as sales minus the cost of goods sold, divided by sales. 
SGA is the ratio of selling, general and administrative expenses to sales. Missing values for 
selling, general and administrative expenses are set to zero. ROA is the ratio of income before 
extraordinary items to the beginning-of-year book value of total assets.  
Operating performance measures are highly industry-dependent and may be affected by 
industry shocks. Therefore, we adjusted each performance measure by its industry mean in 
each year. Specifically, for all firms available in Compustat with the same 4-digit SIC code, 
we calculate the industry mean in each fiscal year and subtract the industry mean from the 
raw value of each performance measure.8 A positive and higher value of those industry-
adjusted measures indicates a better performance than industry peers. By taking into account 
the cross-sectional variation within an industry, we are able to focus on the relative 
performance of firms that engage in customer referencing. Using industry-adjusted 
performance is also more aligned with our research focus on product market effect, given that 
                                                             
7 For simplicity, both subscriptions for firm and year are omitted throughout the paper. 
8 When calculating the industry mean for each variable, we require each industry-year to have at least five 
observations. In other words, if an industry-year has less than five observations, it is dropped, leaving us with a 
final sample of 98,781 firm-year observations.  
16 
 
firms within the same industry compete with each other.9   
The variable of interest is the proxy for the customer referencing propensity as defined 
earlier, i.e., CUS_REF is an indicator if at least one referenced customer satisfies the 
following three conditions: (1) a sales contribution of less than 10%, (2) the company name is 
specifically disclosed, (3) the customer is not a major customer for the previous year. We 
argue that customer referencing serves as verification of the firm’s product quality and its 
ability to fulfill stakeholders’ implicit claims, thereby helping it attract new sales, decrease 
costs and improve its future performance. To the extent that customer referencing is 
associated with a better future performance, the coefficient on CUS_REF is expected to be 
significantly positive. 10 
In equation (1), we control for the whether there is any major customer for which the 
company name is specifically disclosed (MAJ_CUS); customer concentration (CUS_CON); 
sales growth rate (SGRW); size (SIZE); leverage (LEV); cash and cash equivalents (CASH); 
asset tangibility (TANGI); the number of business segments (SEG); firm age (AGE) and 
selling, general and administrative expenses (SGA) in the current year. Specifically, 
MAJ_CUS is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm discloses a major customer with an 
identifiable name, zero otherwise. The prior literature finds that customer concentration has a 
significant influence on firm performance (Patatoukas, 2012; Irvine et al., 2016; Hui et al., 
2016), so we control for CUS_CON. CUS_CON is measured as the customer-sales-based 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, using the sales contribution ratio of all customers. SGRW is the 
increase in sales for this year divided by sales for the previous year. SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of the book value of total assets. LEV is the ratio of total debt to total assets. CASH 
is cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets. TANGI is net property, plant and 
                                                             
9 As reported in Table 5, our results showing a positive association between customer referencing and future 
firm performance are robust to the use of non-industry-adjusted measures. 
10 Since dependent variable SGA is an inverse measure of operating performance, i.e., a lower value represents a 
better performance, the regression coefficient of CUS_REF is expected to be significantly negative when the 
dependent variable is SGA. 
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equipment scaled by total assets. SEG is the natural logarithm of the number of business 
segments reported by the firm. AGE is the natural logarithm of the number of years since the 
firm appears for the first time in the Compustat database. Finally, to control for increases in 
performance due to firm advertising or other promotional activities, we also add the ratio of 
selling, general and administrative expenses to sales (SGA) as an additional control variable. 
We summarize the variable definitions in Appendix C. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at 1% and 99% of their respective distributions to reduce the influence of outliers. 
We also include firm and year fixed effects in the model. By including firm fixed effects, 
we are able to control for the unobserved time-invariant firm characteristics that influence 
future performance and investigate the effect of customer referencing on firm performance. 
We use robust standard errors clustered by firm to address the issue of heteroscedasticity and 
within-firm serial correlation in the error terms. 
3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2, Panel A presents the summary statistics for the variables used in our main 
regression. The mean value of CUS_REF is 0.226, suggesting that approximately 23% of 
firms engaging in customer referencing in their financial reports. The mean value of 
MAJ_CUS is 0.515, indicating that about 52% of the firms disclose at least one major 
customer and the customer name is also specifically disclosed. The summary statistics for the 
other variables are largely consistent with prior studies (e.g., Irvine et al., 2016; Hui et al., 
2016).   
Table 2, Panel B reports the pairwise correlations between performance measures and 
our customer referencing proxy. As expected, ATO is positively correlated with GM and 
ROA, but negatively so with SGA. The Pearson correlations between CUS_REF and the firm 
performance measures suggest that firms that engage in customer referencing tend to have 
lower asset turnover and SGA expenses and higher gross margin and ROA. The negative 
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Pearson correlation between CUS_REF and asset turnover contradicts our prediction, 
probably because other firm characteristics are not controlled.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Customer referencing and future performance 
In this section, we investigate whether and how customer referencing behavior is 
associated with future performance. As noted earlier, we posit that customer referencing 
through disclosing customer information serves as verification of the firm’s product quality 
and signals its ability to perform stakeholders’ implicit claims, thereby helping it attract new 
sales, decrease costs and improve its future performance. To the extent that customer 
referencing is associated with a better future performance, the coefficient on CUS_REF is 
expected to be significantly positive.  
Table 3 presents our main results. Column 1 shows the association between customer 
referencing and future asset turnover. After controlling for firm characteristics as well as firm 
and year fixed effects, we find a significantly positive association between current year 
customer referencing and future year asset turnover. Specifically, the coefficient on 
CUS_REF in column (1) is 0.019 with a t-value of 2.40, which suggests that firms that 
engage in customer referencing have a higher future asset turnover, i.e., 1.9% higher than 
firms that do not. This finding indicates that customer referencing indeed helps firms attract 
new sales. 
In column 2, customer referencing is significantly associated with gross margin in the 
next year. The coefficient on CUS_REF is 0.025 with a t-value of 3.11, which suggests that 
firms that engage in customer referencing have a higher future gross margin, i.e., 2.5% higher 
than firms that do not. This finding is consistent with our prediction that customer referencing 
helps firms decrease input costs. 
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We further examine whether customer referencing helps improve operating efficiency by 
focusing on future selling, general and administrative expenses. We find that the coefficient 
on CUS_REF in column 3 is -0.013 with a t-value of -2.10. This result shows that firms that 
reference customers have future selling, general and administrative expenses (scaled by 
annual sales) that are 1.3% lower than firms that do not. The negative association 
documented above might indicate that firms engaging in customer referencing can help to 
reduce operating expenses, particularly advertising and other promotional expenses, possibly 
because customer referencing can substitute for advertising activities. 
In addition, we examine the effect of customer referencing on the future overall 
performance captured by return on assets. We find a significantly positive association 
between customer referencing and ROA. Specifically, the coefficient on CUS_REF in column 
4 is 0.011 with a t-value of 3.25, which suggests that firms that reference customers have a 
higher future ROA. The coefficient indicates that for such firms, the ROA in the following 
year is 1.1% higher than those that do not. Hence, customer referencing appears to have a 
statistically and economically significant association with future profitability. 
In terms of the control variables, the results are generally consistent with prior literature. 
The results of the association between the disclosure of major customer and future firm 
performance are mixed. The coefficient on MAJ_CUS is insignificant in columns 1 and 4 but 
significant in columns 2 and 3. The mixed results could indicate that the disclosure of major 
customers has limited certification/signaling effects. First, the disclosure of major customers 
is mandatory, meaning that the firms did not choose to disclose with the intention of self-
promotion. In addition, even if the major customers are not disclosed, given their importance, 
stakeholders might already be aware of them even without the disclosure. We find that 
CUS_CON is negatively associated with asset turnover, gross margin and ROA, and 
positively associated with selling, general and administrative expenses. This finding is 
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generally consistent with the prior literature documenting adverse effects of customer 
concentration on future performance (Irvine et al., 2016; Hui et al., 2016). We also find that 
sales growth is positively associated with future performance while cash holding and asset 
tangibility are negatively associated with it. Firm size is associated with better performance in 
terms of return on assets and operating expenses, but it leads to lower asset turnover. More 
leverage improves asset turnover and gross margin but worsens overall performance. The 
number of business segments has a negative impact on gross margin and return on assets. 
Firm age is negatively related to asset turnover. Finally, we find that the current year ratio of 
selling, general and administrative expenses is negatively associated with future year asset 
turnover and return on assets.  
Overall, the above results are consistent with our prediction in H1, suggesting that firms 
that engage in customer referencing have a better future performance than those that do not. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
4.2 Robustness checks 
In this section, we conduct a series of robustness checks to evaluate whether our baseline 
results are sensitive to variable construction methods or an alternative story. 
4.2.1 Alternative measures of customer referencing 
We now consider the robustness of the results to alternative measures of customer 
referencing. First, in seeking to refine the measure of customer referencing, we make some 
minor modifications to the primary proxy (CUS_REF). The primary proxy assumes that a 
firm engages in customer referencing as long as at least one non-major customer is disclosed. 
The reasons for this assumption are twofold. First, it is not clear that there is a linear (or even 
monotonic) relation between the number of non-major customers disclosed and future 
performance. For example, it is likely that if a firm engages in customer referencing to obtain 
product certification to boost its future performance, it might first disclose the customers that 
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have the largest impact, meaning that each additional disclosed customer will have a 
declining or no marginal effect. Second, it facilitates the interpretation and discussion of the 
later cross-sectional analyses. Nevertheless, we examine whether our results are robust to the 
use of a continuous variable that counts the number of disclosed non-major customers. 
Specifically, the continuous measure, CUS_REF1, is defined as natural log of the number of 
referenced customers that satisfy the following three conditions: (1) a sales contribution of 
less than 10%, (2) the company name is specifically disclosed, (3) the customer is not a major 
customer for the previous year. 
In our primary measure of customer referencing (CUS_REF), we consider all non-major 
customers to be voluntarily disclosed with the intention of customer referencing for product 
certification. One might think that customer referencing is more likely to be effective when 
the firm voluntarily discloses relatively more important (e.g., higher sales contribution) non-
major customers. Stated differently, when firms voluntarily disclose more important non-
major customers, they are more likely to be truly engaging in customer referencing. Hence, 
we construct an alternative measure of customer referencing that excludes the disclosure of 
customers with sales of less than 1%. Specifically, CUS_REF2 is defined as an indicator if at 
least one referenced customer satisfies the following three conditions: (1) a sales contribution 
of less than 10% but not equal to or more than 1%; (2) the company name is specifically 
disclosed, (3) the customer is not a major customer for the previous year. 
Another concern of our primary measure is that if a firm voluntarily discloses a non-
major customer that is expected to become a major customer due to increased purchases in 
the following year, the better next-year performance might simply reflect the customer’s 
increased purchases. If so, disclosing the customer might not be viewed as an attempt by the 
firm to engage in customer referencing by relying on the certification from the disclosed 
customer to attract new sales from other customers or to lower marketing expenses. To 
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address this concern, we construct an alternative measure (CUS_REF3) by further requiring 
the referenced non-major customer to not be a major customer in the following year. 
 As reported in Table 4, Panel A, we find consistent results with all of the above three 
alternative measures. In the first 4 columns, we show that the continuous measure of the 
count of the number of customers referenced, CUS_REF1, is associated with better future 
operating performance in terms of higher asset turnover, gross margin, and returns on assets, 
as well as lower selling, general, and administrative expenses. In columns 5 to 8, we show 
that the customer referencing measure, CUS_REF2, that further requires the referenced 
customer to be an important customer, does not change our inference that customer 
referencing has positive effects of product market performance. We further show that in the 
last 4 columns, our results still hold with CUS_REF3, which requires the referenced customer 
to not be a major customer in the following year. 
Next, we consider measures of customer referencing that incorporate customer 
reputation. Prior literature suggests that the reputation of the customer being referenced can 
have an impact on the referencing’s certification and signaling benefits. To maintain its 
reputation, a customer with a high reputation is more likely to be prudent when selecting 
suppliers (Ellram, 1990; Choi and Hartley, 1996), so it is more able to certify its suppliers’ 
product or service quality and the other abilities required to successfully fulfill contracts. By 
revealing that it has successfully passed through a reputable customer’s selection process, a 
firm can thereby utilize its relationship with that customer to reassure potential buyers 
(Jalkala and Salminen, 2010). Hence, a firm is more likely to be engaging in customer 
referencing if it discloses the name of relatively more reputable customers. In the section, we 
examine the robustness of our results to measures of customer referencing that take customer 
reputation into account. 
To establish whether a customer has a high reputation, we need to obtain some 
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information about it, for example, its listing status and financial data. We attempt to obtain 
this information from the Compustat Annual File and the CRSP Stock File, which is the 
approach used in the literature on supplier-customer relationships (e.g., Fee and Thomas, 
2004; Pandit et al., 2011; Ellis et al., 2012). First, we match the customer name to a listed 
company name in the Compustat/CRSP Merged Database.11 Then we can obtain financial 
information for the matched customers from this database. 
There is no single commonly accepted way to capture customer reputation. Therefore, 
we classify a referenced customer’s reputation based on the following characteristics: public 
listing status, market share of sales, and firm size. Publicly listed customers are likely to be 
more well-known than those that are not. Firms with larger sales have a greater market 
presence and receive a greater level of public attention, which results in a better reputation 
(Shamsie, 2003). Prior literature has used a firm’s product market share to proxy for 
reputation (Carter et al., 1998; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Rau, 2000). Finally, larger firms 
enjoy greater name recognition than do smaller firms (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Williams 
and Barrett, 2000). Firm size has been used in empirical studies as a proxy for company 
reputation or overall visibility (Miller, 2006; Bushee and Miller, 2012; Frederickson and 
Zolotoy, 2015). Accordingly, we construct three alternative measures of customer referencing 
by further considering the referenced customer’s reputation. Specifically, we define 
CUS_REF4 (CUS_REF5 / CUS_REF6) as an indicator if at least one referenced customer 
satisfies the following four conditions: (1) a sales contribution of less than 10%, (2) the 
company name is specifically disclosed, (3) the customer is not a major customer for the 
previous year and (4) the customer is a reputable customer in terms of listing status (market 
share / firm size). 
                                                             
11 The Compustat Segment File does not assign a Compustat permanent identifier (GVKEY) to disclosed 
customers. Hence, we need to match the customers to companies in the Compustat Annual and/or CRSP 
database by name. Obviously, many customers will not be matched and hence are classified as non-listed 
customers. 
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Table 4, Panel B presents the results of using the above alternative measures of customer 
referencing that incorporate customer reputation. The coefficients on CUS_REF4 are 
statistically significant in columns 1, 2 and 4. The t-values are 3.23, 2.21and 2.20 
respectively. While the coefficient in column 3 is insignificant (t-value = -1.27), the sign on 
this coefficient is consistent with earlier results indicating that customer referencing lowers 
selling, general, and administrative expenses. Columns 5 to 8 present the results of using 
CUS_REF5 and columns 9 to 12 present the results of using CUS_REF6. Results in these 
columns are similar to those in the first 4 columns. Taken together, the results from this panel 
suggest that our main findings are robust to alternative measures that incorporate customer 
reputation, and they also suggest that the average effect of the customer referencing 
documented in the baseline regression is likely driven by referencing reputable customers. 
 [Insert Table 4 here] 
4.2.2 Use of non-industry-adjusted performance measures 
We re-estimate the regressions by replacing the industry-adjusted performance measures 
with non-adjusted measures. In the baseline regressions, we use industry-adjusted dependent 
variables, because firm performance measures are highly industry dependent and may be 
influenced by industry shocks. Industry-adjusted performance measures exclude the influence 
of industry specificity and are able to capture whether firms perform better than their industry 
peers. However, the literature on the supply-chain setting uses non-industry-adjusted 
performance measures (e.g., Patatoukas, 2012; Irvine et al., 2016; Hui et al., 2016). To 
reconcile our results with those in prior literature, we repeat our main regressions using non-
industry-adjusted dependent variables. As shown in Table 5, the results are qualitatively 
similar to those reported in our baseline regressions.12  
                                                             
12 In subsequent tests, our results are similar when using either industry-adjusted or non-industry-adjusted 
performance. As industry-adjusted performance better captures abnormal performance, we continue to report 
our results based on the adjusted measures. The results for non-industry-adjusted performance are available 
upon request. 
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[Insert Table 5 here] 
4.2.3 Instrumental variable analyses 
In addition, we attempt to address the endogeneity issue by taking the instrumental 
variable (IV) approach. Specifically, we use the industry-level customer referencing 
propensity (IND_CUS_REF) as our IV.  This IV is likely to satisfy the inclusion criterion 
because if a firm is in an industry that typically engages in customer referencing, the firm 
itself is more likely to do so. However, we recognize that this IV has limitations in satisfying 
the exclusion criterion. While one might argue that an industry practice of customer 
referencing is likely to affect a firm’s performance via how it affects the firm’s customer 
referencing practice, it is possible that the referencing practices of other firms in the industry 
can have a direct effect on a firm’s performance due to competition for customers.13  
To implement the IV 2SLS regressions, in the first stage we regress our customer 
referencing proxy on the industry-level referencing propensity in the current year. As shown 
in column 1 of Table 6, IND_CUS_REF is a significant predictor of a firm’s referencing 
propensity (CUS_REF). In the second stage, we regress the future performance measures on 
the instrumented CUS_REF. The second stage results are shown in columns 2 to 5. The 
results indicate that customer referencing has a significant positive association with asset 
turnover, gross margin and return on assets. These results are consistent with our baseline 
results using OLS estimation. In untabulated analyses, we repeat the IV 2SLS estimation by 
using the industry-level customer referencing propensity for the previous year as an 
alternative IV and find similar results.  
 [Insert Table 6 here] 
5. Cross-sectional tests 
                                                             
13 The exclusion criterion essentially requires the instrument be correlated with customer referencing by the firm 
but (essentially) uncorrelated with firm performance, except through variables we control for such as customer 
concentration and sales growth. Understandably, finding such an instrument in the context of the relation 
between firm practices and performance is difficult. Hence, we do not treat our IV regressions as a strong test of 
causality but as an additional robustness check. 
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In this section, we conduct a series of cross-sectional tests to shed light on the 
certification channel through which customer referencing can have an effect on a firm’s 
operating performance. 
5.1 Firm reputation, customer referencing and future performance 
We start by investigating the moderating effect of a firm’s own reputation on the relation 
between customer referencing and future performance. In H2, we argue that a low reputation 
firm is more likely to benefit from customer referencing activities. Hence, we predict that the 
positive association between customer referencing and future performance is more 
pronounced for low reputation firms. 
We measure a firm’s own reputation via two methods. The first is based on market share. 
If a firm has a low market share in its industry, it may not be well known or trusted by 
potential customers, which is suggestive of low reputation. NEGMKSH is the sales divided by 
the total industry sales, multiplied by -1.The second measure is based on firm size. Compared 
to a large firm, a small firm is less known and trusted by potential customers. NEGSIZE is the 
natural logarithm of the book value of total assets, multiplied by -1. A referenced customer 
certifies a firm’s product quality and its ability to fulfill implicit claims. Therefore, we expect 
the coefficients on CUS_REF × NEGMKSH and CUS_REF × NEGSIZE to be significant. 
Table 7, Panel A presents the results for the regressions that use market share to measure 
firm reputation. As shown in the table, the coefficients on the interaction term CUS_REF × 
NEGMKSH are statistically significant in all columns, and the absolute value of the t-values 
ranges from 1.76 to 2.42. These results suggest that customer referencing helps firms, 
especially low reputation firms, attract more sales, decrease input and operating costs and 
thereby improve future overall performance, captured by ROA.  
Table 7, Panel B presents the results of using firm size to measure reputation. The 
coefficients on the interaction term CUS_REF × NEGSIZE are statistically significant in all 
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columns except column 1. In column 1, the coefficient on the interaction term CUS_REF × 
NEGSIZE is 0.004 (t-value = 1.14). These results confirm that low reputation firms benefit 
more from customer referencing activities.  
Overall, the above results are generally consistent with our prediction that the positive 
effect of customer referencing on firm performance is more pronounced for low reputation 
firms, suggesting that low reputation firms benefit more from the certification role of 
customer referencing.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
5.2 Riskier firms, customer referencing and future performance 
Next, we test our third hypothesis by investigating whether the effect of customer 
referencing on future performance is stronger for riskier firms. In H3, we argue that because 
customers have concerns about riskier firms vis-a-vis their long-run, stable provision of 
products and ability to fulfill implicit claims, customer referencing helps such firms increase 
the credibility of their product quality and signal their responsibility. Hence, we predict that 
the positive association between customer referencing and future performance is more 
pronounced for riskier firms. 
We use three proxies to measure risk. A firm is risky if: i) it experiences losses during the 
year, ii) it is financially constrained based on the SA index in Hadlock and Pierce (2010) or 
iii) it faces financial constraints based on the WW index in Whited and Wu (2006). When a 
firm experiences losses or has a high probability of financial constraints, new customers may 
have concerns about its future operation stability and thus be less willing to purchase from it, 
while suppliers, recognizing the firm’s high default risk, are unwilling to offer favorable 
pricing. Customer referencing mitigates the adverse influence of risk by signaling the firm’s 
ability to provide qualified products and fulfill implicit claims as well as its long-run stability 
of cash inflows. Therefore, we expect the coefficients on CUS_REF × LOSS, CUS_REF × 
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SA, and CUS_REF × WW to be significant. 
Table 8, Panel A presents the results for the regressions that use losses to proxy for risk. 
As shown in each column, the coefficient on the interaction term CUS_REF × LOSS is 
statistically significant and with the predicted signs, which suggests that the positive effect of 
customer referencing is stronger when the firm experiences losses during the year. 
Table 8, Panel B presents the results for the regressions that use the SA index to proxy 
for risk. Similarly, the coefficients on the interaction terms CUS_REF × SA are statistically 
significant in all columns. Table 8, Panel C presents the results of using the WW index to 
measure firm risk. The coefficients on CUS_REF × WW are significant in columns 2 to 4.   
Overall, these empirical results are consistent with the prediction that the positive effect 
of customer referencing on future performance is more pronounced for riskier firms, 
suggesting that such firms benefit more from the certification role of customer referencing. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
5.3 Product market competition, customer referencing and future performance 
Finally, we test our last hypothesis by investigating whether the effect of customer 
referencing on future performance is stronger for firms that face high product market 
competition. As discussed earlier, customer referencing is more important for these firms 
because they have a greater need for verification to differentiate themselves from 
competitors.  
We use two measures to proxy for the intensity of product market competition. The first 
proxy is product similarity, provided by Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2016). This measure is 
based on a text-based analysis of firm product descriptions from the annual 10-Ks filed with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2016) calculate 
how a firm is similar to every other firm by calculating firm and firm-pairwise word 
similarity scores and construct a total product similarity measure for each firm. This measure 
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is available during the period from 1996 to 2015. The higher the value of the product 
similarity measure (SIMILARITY), the more similar a firm’s products are to those of other 
firms. When a firm has greater product similarity, it is more difficult for it to differentiate 
itself from its competitors (Hoberg and Phillips, 2016). The second proxy is the widely used 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is the sum of the square of the market share of all 
firms in each industry. NEGHHI is HHI multiplied by -1, so a higher NEGHHI implies higher 
competition. Customer referencing mitigates the influence of competition via certification 
from customers. Therefore, we expect the coefficients on interaction terms CUS_REF × 
SIMILARITY and CUS_REF × NEGHHI to be statistically significant.  
As shown in Table 9, Panel A, the coefficients on the interaction term CUS_REF × 
SIMILARITY are significantly positive in columns 1, 2 and 4, indicating that when firms 
produce non-differentiated products, the firms that engage in customer referencing can have 
higher sales, lower costs and better overall performance than those that do not. Table 9, Panel 
B presents the results of using HHI to measure market competition. The coefficients on the 
interaction term CUS_REF × NEGHHI are significantly positive in columns 2 and 4.  
Overall, the results are generally consistent with the prediction that the positive effect of 
customer referencing on future performance is more pronounced for firms that face high 
product market competition, suggesting that such firms benefit more from the certification 
role of customer referencing. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we exploit customer information voluntarily disclosed in financial reports 
as a proxy for firms’ propensity to engage in customer referencing activities and then 
examine the product market effect of customer referencing. With regards to the product 
market effect of customer referencing, there are two competing arguments: the proprietary 
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cost and certification hypotheses. Under the former, firms view customer information as 
highly proprietary (Ellis et al., 2012; Li et al., 2018). A firm’s future performance would 
deteriorate if a firm’s referenced customers become targeted by its competitors (Fudenberg 
and Tirole, 2000; Esteves, 2009). In the certification argument, a firm may intentionally 
disclose existing customers to certify, for example, its product quality and properties and 
other abilities, by revealing that it has successfully passed through the customer’s selection 
process (e.g., Salminen and Möller, 2004, 2006; Jalkala and Salminen, 2010; Ruokolainen 
and Aarikka-Stenroos, 2016). Firms that engage in customer referencing are therefore able to 
improve their future performance because of their customers’ certification. 
Consistent with the certification channel, our results show that firms engaging in 
customer referencing achieve a better future performance. This finding suggests that 
customer referencing does indeed certify firms’ product quality, properties and reputation for 
fulfilling long-term implicit claims and hence helps the firm attract new sales and improve its 
profitability. Our results are robust to alternative measures of customer referencing and firm 
performance. We also document that this positive effect is more pronounced for low 
reputation firms, riskier firms and for those that face higher product market competition. 
These results suggest that customer referencing is more beneficial for firms in some degree of 
trouble.  
Our study contributes to the literature by providing large-sample evidence of the product 
market effect of customer referencing. In addition, in contrast to the prior customer disclosure 
literature, which focuses on benefits in the capital market, this study investigates the role of 
customer referencing in reducing information asymmetry between suppliers and potential 
customers.  
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Appendix A: Examples of customer referencing in practice 
Figure 1: Customer references examples from the website of Microsoft Hong Kong 
 
 
Source: https://www.microsoft.com/hk/casestudies/ 
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Figure 2: Customer references examples on SAP’s posters and conference presentation 
cover 
 
Figure 2 (a) Figure 2 (b) 
  
 
 
Figure 2 (c) 
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Appendix B: An example of the voluntary disclosure of customers in financial reports 
 
       The following paragraphs are excerpted from Analysts International Corporation’s 10-K 
form. While the sales contributions of both Bank of America Corporation and Lexmark 
International, Inc. each comprise less than 10% of its annual sales, Analysts International 
voluntarily discloses them and provides detailed information about its relationship with these 
customers. 
 
 
FORM 10-K 
  
Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
for the fiscal year ended January 3, 2004 
  
Commission file number  0-4090 
  
ANALYSTS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 
… 
Bank of America Corporation 
  
During the last year our business with Bank of America Corporation, one of the world’s leading financial 
services companies, has grown appreciably.  Headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina, Bank of America has 
an extensive branch network with more than 4,200 locations in 21 states and the District of Columbia.  Because 
our geographic presence closely aligns with their national network, we have become one of the customer’s five 
prime staffing vendors, managing an extensive subsupplier network to meet their business 
objectives.  Additionally, by drawing from our base of minority and/or women-owned suppliers, we have been 
able to exceed Bank of America’s goals in diversity supplier spend. 
Revenue from services provided to Bank of America was approximately 5% and 2% for the fiscal years 
ended January 3, 2004 and December 28, 2002, respectively. 
 
Lexmark International, Inc. 
  
For over ten years, Analysts International has provided staffing services for Lexmark International, Inc., a 
Lexington, Kentucky based company that is a leading developer, manufacturer and supplier of laser and inkjet 
printers, multifunction products, associated supplies and services.  In fiscal 2003, Lexmark chose Analysts 
International as one of three prime vendors to continue to provide staffing services.  The parties signed a service 
agreement for staffing on June 27, 2003.  The initial term of the agreement continues through June 27, 
2005.  Lexmark has the option to extend the term for up to three consecutive one-year periods.  During the last 
year Lexmark engaged Analysts International’s Managed Services Group to implement the Peopleclick, Inc. 
Vendor Management System (VMS), a web-based application for managing temporary labor resources.  Under 
this agreement, Analysts International also provides consolidated billing for all of Lexmark’s contract suppliers, 
and training and process management for the VMS tool and system.  Because the agreement was not fully 
implemented until the end of fiscal 2003, revenue from this portion of the business will be realized beginning in 
fiscal 2004. 
  
Revenue from services provided to Lexmark was approximately 5% and 2% of revenue for the fiscal years 
ended January 3, 2004 and December 28, 2002, respectively. 
… 
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Appendix C: Variable definitions 
This appendix summarizes the definitions of the variables used in the paper. The uppercase characters in the 
parentheses in the right column of the table refer to the item names in the COMPUSTAT database. All 
dependent variables are measured in year t+1, while all independent variables are measured at year t, as 
indicated by their subscripts. 
 
Dependent variables: 
ATO 
The industry-mean-adjusted asset turnover at year t+1, calculated as the asset turnover 
minus the industry mean value. The asset turnover is defined as sales (SALE) divided by 
the beginning-of-year book value of total assets (AT) and the industry mean is calculated 
using all available observations in the Compustat universe with the same fiscal year and 
two-digit SIC code. 
GM 
The industry-mean-adjusted gross margin at year t+1, calculated as the gross margin 
minus the industry mean value. The gross margin is defined as the difference between 
sales (SALE) and the cost of goods sold (COGS), divided by sales (SALE); the industry 
mean is calculated using all available observations in the Compustat universe with the 
same fiscal year and two-digit SIC code. 
SGA 
Industry-mean-adjusted selling, general and administration expenses at year t+1, 
calculated as the selling, general and administration expenses minus the industry mean 
value. The selling, general and administration expenses is defined as selling, general and 
administration expenses (XSGA) scaled by sales (SALE) and the industry mean is 
calculated using all available observations in the Compustat universe with the same fiscal 
year and two-digit SIC code. 
ROA 
The industry-mean-adjusted return on assets at year t+1, calculated as the return on assets 
minus the industry mean value. The return on assets is defined as income before 
extraordinary items (IB) divided by the beginning-of-year book value of total assets (AT) 
and the industry mean is calculated using all available observations in the Compustat 
universe with the same fiscal year and two-digit SIC code. 
Nonadj_ATO The non-industry-adjusted asset turnover, defined as sales (SALE) divided by the beginning-of-year book value of total assets (AT). 
Nonadj_GM The non-industry-adjusted gross margin, defined as the difference between sales (SALE) and the cost of goods sold (COGS), divided by sales (SALE). 
Nonadj_SGA Non-industry-adjusted selling, general and administration expenses, defined as selling, general and administration expenses (XSGA) scaled by sales (SALE). 
Nonadj_ROA The non-industry-adjusted return on assets, defined as income before extraordinary items (IB) divided by the beginning-of-year book value of total assets (AT). 
Key independent variable: 
CUS_REF 
The primary measure of customer referencing propensity. It is an indicator variable equal 
to 1 if at least one referenced customer satisfies the following three conditions: (1) a sales 
contribution of less than 10%, (2) the company name is specifically disclosed and (3) the 
customer is not a major customer for the previous year. Otherwise, it equals to 0. 
Alternative measures of customer referencing: 
CUS_REF1  
Natural log of the number of referenced customers that satisfy the following three 
conditions: (1) a sales contribution of less than 10%, (2) the company name is specifically 
disclosed (3) the customer is not a major customer for the previous year. 
CUS_REF2  
An indicator if at least one referenced customer satisfies the following three conditions: 
(1) a sales contribution of less than 10% but equal to or more than 1%; (2) the company 
name is specifically disclosed and (3) the customer is not a major customer for the 
previous year. 
CUS_REF3  
An indicator if at least one referenced customer satisfies the following four conditions: 
(1) a sales contribution of less than 10%, (2) the company name is specifically disclosed, 
(3) the customer is not a major customer for the previous year and (4) the customer is not 
a major customer the following year. 
CUS_REF4  
An indicator if at least one referenced customer satisfies the following four conditions: 
(1) a sales contribution of less than 10%, (2) the company name is specifically disclosed, 
(3) the customer is not a major customer for the previous year and (4) the customer is a 
reputable customer in terms of listing status, i.e., the referenced customer is a listed 
company. 
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CUS_REF5  
An indicator if at least one referenced customer satisfies the following four conditions: 
(1) a sales contribution of less than 10%, (2) the company name is specifically disclosed, 
(3) the customer is not a major customer for the previous year and (4) the customer is a 
reputable customer in terms of market share, i.e., the customer’s market share is above 
the industry-year median. 
CUS_REF6  
An indicator if at least one referenced customer satisfies the following four conditions: 
(1) a sales contribution of less than 10%, (2) the company name is specifically disclosed, 
(3) the customer is not a major customer for the previous year and (4) the customer is a 
reputable customer in terms of firm size, i.e., the customer’s total assets are above the 
industry-year median. 
Other variables: (in alphabetical order) 
AGE  Firm age measured by the natural logarithm of the number of years since the first time the firm appears in the Compustat database. 
CASH  Cash and cash equivalents (CHE) scaled by total assets (AT). 
CUS_CON  Customer concentration calculated as the customer-sales-based Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, using the sales fraction of all disclosed customers. 
IND_CUS_REF  
Instrumental variable defined as the industry-level customer referencing propensity, 
calculated as the voluntary disclosure rate of identifiable customer names in each 
industry-year. 
LEV  Leverage ratio defined as total liability (LT) divided by total assets (AT). 
LOSS  A dummy variable equal to one if income before extraordinary items (IB t) is negative and zero otherwise. 
MAJ_CUS  
An indicator variable equal to one if a firm mandatorily disclosed a major customer 
(purchasing more than 10% of the firm’s annual sales) with an identifiable company 
name, equal to zero otherwise. 
NEGHHI  
An inverse measure of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), calculated as negative one 
times HHI. HHI is the sum of the square of the market share of all firms in each two-digit 
SIC industry. 
NEGMKSH  An inverse measure of market share, calculated as negative one times the firm’s fraction of annual sales to the total revenue of the two-digit SIC industry. 
NEGSIZE  An inverse measure of firm size, calculated as negative one times the natural logarithm of total assets (AT t). 
SA  
Hadlock and Pierce’s (2010) SA index. i.e., 
SA = −0.737SIZE + 0.043SIZE2 − 0.040AGE, 
where SIZE is the natural log of total assets and AGE is the number of years the firm has 
been in the Compustat database. 
SEG  The natural logarithm of the number of business segments reported by firms. 
SGA  Selling, general and administration expenses (XSGA) scaled by sales (SALE). 
SGRW  Sales growth rate of sales from year t-1 to year t, i.e., SGRW = (SALE t –SALE t-1) /SALE 
t-1. 
SIMILARITY  
Firm-year-level product similarity measure introduced by Hoberg and Phillips (2016), 
which is based on a textual analysis of firm product descriptions from annual 10-Ks filed 
with the SEC. 
SIZE  Firm size measured by the natural logarithm of total assets (AT). 
TANGI  Net property, plant and equipment (PPENT) scaled by total assets (AT). 
WW  
Whited and Wu’s (2006) WW index. i.e., 
WW = −0.091CFO −0.062DIV +0.021TLTD −0.044SIZE +0.102ISGRW −0.035SGRW, 
where CFO is the ratio of operating cash flow to lagged total assets; DIV is an indicator 
that equals 1 if the firm pays cash dividends, 0 otherwise; TLTD is the ratio of long-term 
debt to total assets; SIZE is the natural log of total assets; ISGRW is the firm's industry 
average sales growth; SGRW is the firm’s own sales growth rate from year t-1 to year t. 
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Figure 1 Distribution of disclosed customers 
This figure depicts the distribution of customers from 1976 to 2016. The x-axis and the y-axis indicate the sales 
contribution and percentage of customers, respectively. A customer’s sales contribution ratio is equal to sales to 
the customer divided by the firm’s total sales in a year. The height of each bar represents the percentage of total 
customers that are within a specific interval of contribution ratio. The width of each bar is 1%, meaning that the 
sales contribution is between x% and (x+1)%. Customers with a sales contribution greater than 41% are 
excluded to give a clearer illustration of the distribution of voluntarily disclosed customers.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
(0%-1%) [10%-11%) [20%-21%) [30%-31%) [40%-41%) 
Percentage 
Sales contribution 
 of customer    
Major customers 
Voluntarily 
disclosed  
customers 
41 
 
Table 1 Sample selection and distribution 
Panel A shows the details of the sample selection procedure and Panel B shows the distribution of the firm-year 
observations across different industries, as well as the frequency of customer referencing (CUS_REF = 1) in 
each industry. CUS_REF is an indicator of at least one referenced customer satisfying the following three 
conditions: a sales contribution of less than 10%, the company name is specifically disclosed and the customer 
is not a major customer for the previous year. 
 
Panel A. Sample selection 
 
# of firm-year 
-customer  
observations 
# of firm-year 
observations 
All available data extracted from Compustat Segments – Customer 
Database, 1976-2016 508,827  
Excluding non-company customers (210,746)  
 298,081 120,742 
To further exclude:    
(1) without a match in Compustat Fundamentals Annual Files  (22) 
(2) utilities (SIC code 4900-4999) and financial firms  (SIC code 
6000-6999)  (10,664) 
(3) observations with missing data to construct required variables  (11,275) 
Final sample size  98,781 
 
Panel B. Sample distribution by industry 
  Number of observations 
% of 
the total 
% of 
CUS_REF=1 
Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing (SIC code 0100-0999) 389 0.39% 24.70% 
Mining (SIC code 1000-1499) 7,234 8.34% 23.60% 
Construction (SIC code 1500-1799) 1,007 1.02% 22.90% 
Manufacturing (SIC code 2000-3999) 56,578 57.29% 22.20% 
Transportation, Communications, Electric (SIC code 4000-4899) 5,831 5.90% 26.50% 
Wholesale and Retail Trade (SIC code 5000-5999) 6,065 6.14% 19.40% 
Services (SIC code 7000-8999) 19,203 19.44% 23.20% 
Public Administration and non-classifiable (SIC code 9100-9999) 1,475 1.47% 23.00% 
Total (Average) 98,781 100.00% 22.60% 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A reports the summary statistics for the variables used in our main regression to test the effect of customer 
referencing on future performance. Panel B presents the pairwise correlation coefficients between the key 
variables in our main regression. The Pearson's correlation coefficients are shown in the lower triangle while the 
Spearman's rank correlations are presented above the diagonal. The number of firm-year observations in our 
final sample is 98,781. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. Variable definitions are 
summarized in Appendix C. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Summary statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. P25 Median P75 
ATO 0.112 0.743 -0.336 -0.029 0.387 
GM 0.011 0.298 -0.101 0.016 0.167 
SGA -0.008 0.326 -0.191 -0.069 0.066 
ROA 0.029 0.283 -0.027 0.073 0.172 
CUS_REF 0.226 0.419 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MAJ_CUS 0.515 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
CUS_CON 0.125 0.180 0.014 0.055 0.154 
SGRW  0.158 0.352 -0.030 0.101 0.287 
SIZE  4.389 2.348 2.684 4.288 6.025 
LEV  0.508 0.266 0.291 0.494 0.692 
CASH  0.193 0.220 0.027 0.101 0.289 
TANGI  0.276 0.239 0.086 0.201 0.402 
SEG  0.435 0.638 0.000 0.000 0.693 
AGE  2.227 0.928 1.609 2.197 2.944 
SGA  0.311 0.281 0.109 0.226 0.418 
 
Panel B. Correlations 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. ATO  1 -0.061*** -0.217*** 0.311*** 0.002 -0.001 
2. GM  0.015*** 1 0.395*** 0.326*** -0.005 -0.014*** 
3. SGA  -0.205*** 0.249*** 1 -0.422*** -0.051*** -0.019*** 
4. ROA  0.174*** 0.354*** -0.508*** 1 0.042*** -0.002 
5. CUS_REF  -0.012*** 0.013*** -0.069*** 0.062*** 1 0.014*** 
6. MAJ_CUS  -0.006* -0.009** -0.034*** 0.020*** 0.014*** 1 
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Table 3 Customer referencing and future performance 
The table presents the baseline results for the average effect of customer referencing on future firm performance. 
In each column, the dependent variable is one measure of industry-adjusted performance in year t+1: asset 
turnover (ATO), gross margin (GM), selling, general, and administrative expenses (SGA), and return on assets 
(ROA). All independent variables are calculated in year t. The variable of interest, CUS_REF, is the primary 
measure of customer referencing propensity. It is an indicator of at least one referenced customer satisfying the 
following three conditions: a sales contribution of less than 10%, the company name is specifically disclosed 
and the customer is not a major customer for the previous year. Variable definitions are summarized in 
Appendix C. Firm and year fixed effects are included and the t-values in the parentheses are based on robust 
standard errors clustered by firm. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ATO GM SGA ROA 
CUS_REF 0.019** 
(2.40) 
0.025*** 
(3.11) 
-0.013** 
(-2.10) 
0.011*** 
(3.25) 
MAJ_CUS  0.011 
(1.27) 
0.016** 
(2.02) 
-0.016** 
(-2.13) 
0.002 
(0.49) 
CUS_CON -0.036 
(-1.18) 
-0.327*** 
(-7.05) 
0.084** 
(2.36) 
-0.068*** 
(-4.16) 
SGRW 0.040*** 
(9.93) 
0.035*** 
(5.55) 
-0.025*** 
(-5.17) 
0.004 
(1.51) 
SIZE -0.363*** 
(-44.87) 
0.007 
(1.05) 
-0.050*** 
(-8.44) 
0.045*** 
(12.94) 
LEV 0.198*** 
(12.88) 
0.034** 
(2.08) 
0.059*** 
(3.76) 
-0.176*** 
(-16.50) 
CASH -0.832*** 
(-26.08) 
-0.259*** 
(-6.64) 
0.440*** 
(12.51) 
-0.004 
(-0.24) 
TANGI -0.560*** 
(-11.59) 
-0.161*** 
(-3.39) 
-0.018 
(-0.43) 
-0.234*** 
(-10.63) 
SEG 0.013 
(1.58) 
-0.027*** 
(-4.24) 
0.001 
(0.20) 
-0.020*** 
(-6.07) 
AGE -0.100*** 
(-8.92) 
-0.006 
(-0.63) 
-0.012 
(-1.46) 
-0.008* 
(-1.65) 
SGA -0.117*** 
(-17.08) 
0.029** 
(1.99) 
 
 
-0.102*** 
(-17.77) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 98,781 98,781 98,781 98,781 
adj. R2 0.634 0.516 0.563 0.587 
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Table 4 Alternative measures of customer referencing 
The table presents a robustness check using alternative measures of customer referencing. In Panel A, we first consider a continuous measure (CUS_REF1) to capture the 
number of customers the firm references. Based on the primary measure, we further restrict the sales contribution of the referenced customer to be equal to or more than 1% 
(CUS_REF2) or require the referenced customer to not be a major customer the following year (CUS_REF3). In Panel B, we redefine the measure to capture the referencing 
of reputable customers. The referenced customer is considered reputable if it is a listed company (CUS_REF4), its market share is above the industry median (CUS_REF5), or 
its total assets are above the industry median (CUS_REF6). In each column, the dependent variable is one measure of industry-adjusted performance in year t+1: asset 
turnover (ATO), gross margin (GM), selling, general, and administrative expenses (SGA), and return on assets (ROA). All independent variables are calculated in year t. 
Variable definitions are summarized in Appendix C. Firm and year fixed effects are included and the t-values in the parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered 
by firm. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. Alternative measures of customer referencing with minor modifications to CUS_REF 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8 (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 ATO GM SGA ROA ATO GM SGA ROA ATO GM SGA ROA 
CUS_REF1 0.023*** 
(3.01) 
0.022*** 
(3.18) 
-0.011** 
(-2.02) 
0.010*** 
(3.11) 
        
CUS_REF2     0.022** 
(2.52) 
0.023*** 
(2.77) 
-0.021*** 
(-3.51) 
0.012*** 
(3.30) 
    
CUS_REF3         0.018** 
(2.18) 
0.026*** 
(3.07) 
-0.014** 
(-2.18) 
0.012*** 
(3.32) 
MAJ_CUS  0.011 
(1.34) 
0.016** 
(2.04) 
-0.016** 
(-2.14) 
0.002 
(0.51) 
0.010 
(1.18) 
0.015* 
(1.87) 
-0.015** 
(-2.08) 
0.001 
(0.36) 
0.012 
(1.40) 
0.016** 
(1.97) 
-0.015* 
(-1.95) 
0.002 
(0.43) 
CUS_CON -0.035 
(-1.17) 
-0.328*** 
(-7.06) 
0.084** 
(2.37) 
-0.068*** 
(-4.18) 
-0.036 
(-1.18) 
-0.328*** 
(-7.06) 
0.083** 
(2.35) 
-0.068*** 
(-4.18) 
-0.031 
(-1.01) 
-0.317*** 
(-6.76) 
0.087** 
(2.40) 
-0.066*** 
(-3.96) 
SGRW 0.040*** 
(9.94) 
0.035*** 
(5.55) 
-0.025*** 
(-5.17) 
0.004 
(1.51) 
0.040*** 
(9.94) 
0.035*** 
(5.55) 
-0.025*** 
(-5.17) 
0.004 
(1.51) 
0.040*** 
(9.86) 
0.035*** 
(5.27) 
-0.026*** 
(-5.16) 
0.003 
(1.11) 
SIZE -0.363*** 
(-44.89) 
0.007 
(1.04) 
-0.050*** 
(-8.44) 
0.045*** 
(12.93) 
-0.363*** 
(-44.87) 
0.007 
(1.07) 
-0.050*** 
(-8.45) 
0.045*** 
(12.96) 
-0.362*** 
(-44.62) 
0.008 
(1.22) 
-0.050*** 
(-8.45) 
0.046*** 
(13.16) 
LEV 0.198*** 
(12.87) 
0.034** 
(2.08) 
0.059*** 
(3.76) 
-0.176*** 
(-16.50) 
0.198*** 
(12.89) 
0.034** 
(2.09) 
0.059*** 
(3.75) 
-0.176*** 
(-16.49) 
0.197*** 
(12.77) 
0.032** 
(2.01) 
0.062*** 
(3.88) 
-0.179*** 
(-16.64) 
CASH -0.832*** 
(-26.09) 
-0.259*** 
(-6.65) 
0.440*** 
(12.51) 
-0.004 
(-0.24) 
-0.832*** 
(-26.08) 
-0.259*** 
(-6.64) 
0.440*** 
(12.50) 
-0.004 
(-0.23) 
-0.822*** 
(-25.72) 
-0.264*** 
(-6.74) 
0.438*** 
(12.41) 
-0.005 
(-0.32) 
TANGI -0.560*** 
(-11.60) 
-0.161*** 
(-3.40) 
-0.018 
(-0.43) 
-0.235*** 
(-10.63) 
-0.560*** 
(-11.60) 
-0.161*** 
(-3.39) 
-0.017 
(-0.43) 
-0.234*** 
(-10.63) 
-0.546*** 
(-11.27) 
-0.162*** 
(-3.39) 
-0.024 
(-0.57) 
-0.232*** 
(-10.37) 
SEG 0.013 
(1.56) 
-0.027*** 
(-4.24) 
0.001 
(0.20) 
-0.020*** 
(-6.07) 
0.013 
(1.57) 
-0.027*** 
(-4.24) 
0.001 
(0.24) 
-0.020*** 
(-6.08) 
0.013 
(1.57) 
-0.026*** 
(-4.13) 
0.001 
(0.18) 
-0.020*** 
(-5.97) 
AGE -0.100*** 
(-8.90) 
-0.006 
(-0.63) 
-0.012 
(-1.46) 
-0.008* 
(-1.65) 
-0.100*** 
(-8.93) 
-0.006 
(-0.66) 
-0.012 
(-1.47) 
-0.008* 
(-1.67) 
-0.096*** 
(-8.52) 
-0.004 
(-0.44) 
-0.012 
(-1.42) 
-0.007 
(-1.53) 
SGA -0.117*** 
(-17.08) 
0.029** 
(1.99) 
 
 
-0.102*** 
(-17.77) 
-0.117*** 
(-17.08) 
0.029** 
(1.99) 
 
 
-0.102*** 
(-17.76) 
-0.117*** 
(-16.97) 
0.030** 
(1.98) 
 
 
-0.103*** 
(-17.60) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 98,781 98,781 98,781 98,781 98,781 98,781 98,781 98,781 98,781 98,781 98,781 98,781 
adj. R2 0.634 0.516 0.563 0.587 0.634 0.516 0.563 0.587 0.635 0.517 0.566 0.591 
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Table 4 - Cont’d 
 
Panel B. Redefined measures that capture the referencing of reputable customers  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8 (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 ATO GM SGA ROA ATO GM SGA ROA ATO GM SGA ROA 
CUS_REF4 0.028*** 
(3.23) 
0.018** 
(2.21) 
-0.008 
(-1.27) 
0.008** 
(2.20) 
        
CUS_REF5     0.034*** 
(3.78) 
0.023*** 
(2.68) 
-0.007 
(-1.10) 
0.011*** 
(2.98) 
    
CUS_REF6         0.034*** 
(3.79) 
0.023** 
(2.56) 
-0.008 
(-1.26) 
0.012*** 
(3.21) 
MAJ_CUS  0.011 
(1.35) 
0.016** 
(1.97) 
-0.015** 
(-2.09) 
0.002 
(0.45) 
0.011 
(1.36) 
0.016** 
(1.99) 
-0.015** 
(-2.08) 
0.002 
(0.47) 
0.011 
(1.36) 
0.016** 
(1.98) 
-0.015** 
(-2.09) 
0.002 
(0.48) 
CUS_CON -0.036 
(-1.19) 
-0.329*** 
(-7.08) 
0.085** 
(2.39) 
-0.069*** 
(-4.21) 
-0.036 
(-1.20) 
-0.329*** 
(-7.09) 
0.085** 
(2.39) 
-0.069*** 
(-4.22) 
-0.036 
(-1.21) 
-0.329*** 
(-7.09) 
0.085** 
(2.39) 
-0.069*** 
(-4.22) 
SGRW 0.040*** 
(9.92) 
0.035*** 
(5.54) 
-0.025*** 
(-5.16) 
0.004 
(1.50) 
0.040*** 
(9.92) 
0.035*** 
(5.54) 
-0.025*** 
(-5.16) 
0.004 
(1.50) 
0.040*** 
(9.92) 
0.035*** 
(5.54) 
-0.025*** 
(-5.16) 
0.004 
(1.50) 
SIZE -0.363*** 
(-44.90) 
0.007 
(1.07) 
-0.050*** 
(-8.46) 
0.045*** 
(12.96) 
-0.363*** 
(-44.90) 
0.007 
(1.07) 
-0.050*** 
(-8.47) 
0.045*** 
(12.96) 
-0.363*** 
(-44.90) 
0.007 
(1.07) 
-0.050*** 
(-8.46) 
0.045*** 
(12.95) 
LEV 0.198*** 
(12.88) 
0.034** 
(2.09) 
0.059*** 
(3.76) 
-0.176*** 
(-16.50) 
0.198*** 
(12.88) 
0.034** 
(2.09) 
0.059*** 
(3.76) 
-0.176*** 
(-16.50) 
0.198*** 
(12.88) 
0.034** 
(2.09) 
0.059*** 
(3.76) 
-0.176*** 
(-16.50) 
CASH -0.832*** 
(-26.07) 
-0.259*** 
(-6.64) 
0.440*** 
(12.51) 
-0.004 
(-0.23) 
-0.832*** 
(-26.08) 
-0.259*** 
(-6.65) 
0.440*** 
(12.51) 
-0.004 
(-0.23) 
-0.832*** 
(-26.08) 
-0.259*** 
(-6.65) 
0.440*** 
(12.51) 
-0.004 
(-0.23) 
TANGI -0.559*** 
(-11.59) 
-0.161*** 
(-3.38) 
-0.018 
(-0.43) 
-0.234*** 
(-10.62) 
-0.559*** 
(-11.59) 
-0.160*** 
(-3.38) 
-0.018 
(-0.44) 
-0.234*** 
(-10.61) 
-0.559*** 
(-11.59) 
-0.160*** 
(-3.38) 
-0.018 
(-0.44) 
-0.234*** 
(-10.61) 
SEG 0.013 
(1.58) 
-0.027*** 
(-4.19) 
0.001 
(0.17) 
-0.020*** 
(-6.03) 
0.013 
(1.59) 
-0.027*** 
(-4.19) 
0.001 
(0.16) 
-0.020*** 
(-6.03) 
0.013 
(1.58) 
-0.027*** 
(-4.19) 
0.001 
(0.17) 
-0.020*** 
(-6.03) 
AGE -0.100*** 
(-8.93) 
-0.006 
(-0.68) 
-0.012 
(-1.43) 
-0.008* 
(-1.69) 
-0.100*** 
(-8.92) 
-0.006 
(-0.68) 
-0.012 
(-1.43) 
-0.008* 
(-1.68) 
-0.100*** 
(-8.92) 
-0.006 
(-0.68) 
-0.012 
(-1.43) 
-0.008* 
(-1.69) 
SGA -0.117*** 
(-17.08) 
0.029** 
(1.98) 
 
 
-0.102*** 
(-17.77) 
-0.117*** 
(-17.08) 
0.029** 
(1.99) 
 
 
-0.102*** 
(-17.77) 
-0.117*** 
(-17.08) 
0.029** 
(1.99) 
 
 
-0.102*** 
(-17.77) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 98,781 98,781 98,781 98,781 98,781 98,781 98,781 98,781 98,781 98,781 98,781 98,781 
adj. R2 0.634 0.516 0.563 0.587 0.634 0.516 0.563 0.587 0.634 0.516 0.563 0.587 
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Table 5 Non-industry-adjusted performance measures 
The table presents a robustness check using non-industry-adjusted measures of firm performance. In each 
column, the dependent variable is one measure of non-industry-adjusted performance in year t+1: asset turnover 
(Nonadj_ATO), gross margin (Nonadj_GM), selling, general, and administrative expenses (Nonadj_SGA), and 
return on assets (Nonadj_ROA). All independent variables are calculated in year t. The variable of interest, 
CUS_REF, is the primary measure of customer referencing propensity. It is an indicator of at least one 
referenced customer satisfying the following three conditions: a sales contribution of less than 10%, the 
company name is specifically disclosed and the customer is not a major customer for the previous year. Variable 
definitions are summarized in Appendix C. Firm and year fixed effects are included and the t-values in the 
parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Nonadj_ATO Nonadj_GM Nonadj_SGA Nonadj_ROA 
CUS_REF 0.018** 
(2.23) 
0.023*** 
(2.89) 
-0.013** 
(-2.10) 
0.008** 
(2.44) 
MAJ_CUS  0.013 
(1.48) 
0.014* 
(1.75) 
-0.018** 
(-2.37) 
0.002 
(0.41) 
CUS_CON -0.036 
(-1.16) 
-0.326*** 
(-7.02) 
0.082** 
(2.30) 
-0.069*** 
(-4.33) 
SGRW 0.043*** 
(10.36) 
0.036*** 
(5.60) 
-0.025*** 
(-5.08) 
0.004 
(1.57) 
SIZE -0.374*** 
(-44.98) 
0.002 
(0.36) 
-0.048*** 
(-8.04) 
0.042*** 
(12.42) 
LEV 0.203*** 
(12.66) 
0.030* 
(1.84) 
0.061*** 
(3.86) 
-0.183*** 
(-17.29) 
CASH -0.847*** 
(-25.87) 
-0.263*** 
(-6.70) 
0.448*** 
(12.63) 
-0.001 
(-0.07) 
TANGI -0.558*** 
(-11.24) 
-0.173*** 
(-3.60) 
-0.027 
(-0.66) 
-0.225*** 
(-10.50) 
SEG 0.011 
(1.34) 
-0.023*** 
(-3.68) 
0.001 
(0.12) 
-0.018*** 
(-5.59) 
AGE -0.107*** 
(-9.21) 
-0.003 
(-0.34) 
-0.013 
(-1.51) 
-0.007 
(-1.61) 
SGA -0.121*** 
(-17.09) 
0.029* 
(1.94) 
 
 
-0.105*** 
(-18.23) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 98,781 98,781 98,781 98,781 
adj. R2 0.704 0.532 0.586 0.613 
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Table 6 IV-2SLS estimator 
The table presents a robustness check using an IV approach to address endogeneity concerns. Specifically, we 
use the industry level propensity for customer referencing (IND_CUS_REF) as the instrumental variable of 
CUS_REF. The first stage results are presented in column 1 while the second stage results are presented in the 
other 4 columns. In each of the last four columns, the dependent variable is one measure of industry-adjusted 
performance in year t+1: asset turnover (ATO), gross margin (GM), selling, general, and administrative expenses 
(SGA), and return on assets (ROA). All independent variables are calculated in year t. Variable definitions are 
summarized in Appendix C. Firm and year fixed effects are included and the t-values in the parentheses are 
based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
Dep. Var. = CUS_REF ATO GM SGA ROA  
IND_CUS_REF 0.814*** 
(28.63) 
     
Instrumented 
CUS_REF 
 0.128** 
(2.09) 
0.067* 
(1.87) 
-0.010 
(-0.30) 
0.041** 
(2.14) 
 
MAJ_CUS  -0.060*** 
(-9.99) 
0.017* 
(1.90) 
0.019** 
(2.26) 
-0.016** 
(-2.05) 
0.004 
(0.91) 
 
CUS_CON -0.113*** 
(-7.38) 
-0.023 
(-0.74) 
-0.322*** 
(-6.91) 
0.084** 
(2.34) 
-0.064*** 
(-3.90) 
 
SGRW -0.002 
(-1.27) 
0.040*** 
(9.98) 
0.036*** 
(5.56) 
-0.025*** 
(-5.17) 
0.004 
(1.53) 
 
SIZE 0.015*** 
(4.56) 
-0.365*** 
(-44.51) 
0.006 
(0.95) 
-0.050*** 
(-8.37) 
0.044*** 
(12.74) 
 
LEV 0.009* 
(1.87) 
0.197*** 
(12.80) 
0.033** 
(2.06) 
0.059*** 
(3.76) 
-0.177*** 
(-16.54) 
 
CASH -0.015 
(-1.07) 
-0.831*** 
(-26.01) 
-0.259*** 
(-6.63) 
0.440*** 
(12.50) 
-0.003 
(-0.21) 
 
TANGI 0.024 
(1.12) 
-0.562*** 
(-11.62) 
-0.162*** 
(-3.41) 
-0.018 
(-0.43) 
-0.235*** 
(-10.66) 
 
SEG 0.022*** 
(4.23) 
0.010 
(1.25) 
-0.028*** 
(-4.32) 
0.001 
(0.19) 
-0.021*** 
(-6.22) 
 
AGE -0.030*** 
(-4.90) 
-0.096*** 
(-8.46) 
-0.004 
(-0.46) 
-0.012 
(-1.44) 
-0.007 
(-1.40) 
 
SGA -0.008*** 
(-3.04) 
-0.116*** 
(-16.88) 
0.030** 
(2.01) 
 
 
-0.102*** 
(-17.73) 
 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
N 98,781 98,781 98,781 98,781 98,781  
adj. R2 0.376 0.633 0.516 0.563 0.586  
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Table 7 Low reputation firms, customer referencing and future performance 
The table presents the results for the moderating effect of a firm’s own reputation on the relation between 
customer referencing and future performance. Firm reputation is measured by market share in Panel A and firm 
size in Panel B. To investigate whether the product market effect of customer referencing is stronger for firms 
with a low reputation, we interact the customer referencing measure (CUS_REF) with NEGMKSH (negative one 
times market share) and NEGSIZE (negative one times firm size), respectively. In each column, the dependent 
variable is one measure of industry-adjusted performance in year t+1: asset turnover (ATO), gross margin (GM), 
selling, general, and administrative expenses (SGA), and return on assets (ROA). All independent variables are 
calculated in year t. Variable definitions are summarized in Appendix C. Firm and year fixed effects are included 
and the t-values in the parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Firms with a low market share 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ATO GM SGA ROA 
CUS_REF × NEGMKSH 1.107** 
(2.42) 
0.486** 
(2.33) 
-0.326* 
(-1.91) 
0.206* 
(1.76) 
CUS_REF  0.024*** 
(2.93) 
0.027*** 
(3.10) 
-0.014** 
(-2.15) 
0.012*** 
(3.24) 
NEGMKSH  -5.300*** 
(-5.66) 
0.866*** 
(2.92) 
-1.150*** 
(-4.43) 
2.371*** 
(10.30) 
MAJ_CUS  0.011 
(1.35) 
0.016** 
(1.97) 
-0.015** 
(-2.08) 
0.001 
(0.34) 
CUS_CON -0.037 
(-1.21) 
-0.327*** 
(-7.04) 
0.083** 
(2.35) 
-0.067*** 
(-4.12) 
SGRW 0.040*** 
(9.95) 
0.035*** 
(5.55) 
-0.025*** 
(-5.16) 
0.004 
(1.50) 
SIZE -0.371*** 
(-44.90) 
0.009 
(1.24) 
-0.052*** 
(-8.45) 
0.048*** 
(13.55) 
LEV 0.194*** 
(12.63) 
0.034** 
(2.13) 
0.058*** 
(3.70) 
-0.174*** 
(-16.35) 
CASH -0.828*** 
(-25.95) 
-0.260*** 
(-6.66) 
0.441*** 
(12.53) 
-0.006 
(-0.38) 
TANGI -0.557*** 
(-11.54) 
-0.161*** 
(-3.40) 
-0.017 
(-0.41) 
-0.236*** 
(-10.70) 
SEG 0.010 
(1.22) 
-0.026*** 
(-4.18) 
0.000 
(0.08) 
-0.019*** 
(-5.67) 
AGE -0.101*** 
(-8.99) 
-0.006 
(-0.62) 
-0.012 
(-1.47) 
-0.007 
(-1.60) 
SGA -0.117*** 
(-17.10) 
0.029** 
(2.00) 
 
 
-0.102*** 
(-17.76) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 98,781 98,781 98,781 98,781 
adj. R2 0.635 0.516 0.563 0.587 
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Table 7 - Cont’d 
 
Panel B. Small firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ATO GM SGA ROA 
CUS_REF × NEGSIZE 0.004 
(1.14) 
0.008** 
(2.54) 
-0.007** 
(-2.42) 
0.008*** 
(4.74) 
CUS_REF 0.038* 
(1.83) 
0.063*** 
(3.24) 
-0.044** 
(-2.53) 
0.049*** 
(4.75) 
NEGSIZE 0.362*** 
(44.20) 
-0.009 
(-1.30) 
0.052*** 
(8.59) 
-0.046*** 
(-13.28) 
MAJ_CUS 0.010 
(1.22) 
0.015* 
(1.91) 
-0.015** 
(-2.04) 
0.001 
(0.27) 
CUS_CON -0.035 
(-1.14) 
-0.325*** 
(-7.01) 
0.082** 
(2.31) 
-0.066*** 
(-4.04) 
SGRW 0.040*** 
(9.94) 
0.036*** 
(5.56) 
-0.025*** 
(-5.17) 
0.004 
(1.53) 
LEV 0.198*** 
(12.90) 
0.034** 
(2.11) 
0.058*** 
(3.74) 
-0.176*** 
(-16.49) 
CASH -0.832*** 
(-26.09) 
-0.259*** 
(-6.64) 
0.440*** 
(12.51) 
-0.004 
(-0.24) 
TANGI -0.559*** 
(-11.59) 
-0.161*** 
(-3.39) 
-0.018 
(-0.44) 
-0.234*** 
(-10.63) 
SEG 0.013 
(1.59) 
-0.027*** 
(-4.23) 
0.001 
(0.19) 
-0.020*** 
(-6.05) 
AGE -0.100*** 
(-8.91) 
-0.006 
(-0.60) 
-0.013 
(-1.49) 
-0.007 
(-1.59) 
SGA -0.116*** 
(-17.06) 
0.029** 
(2.00) 
 
 
-0.102*** 
(-17.75) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 98,781 98,781 98,781 98,781 
adj. R2 0.634 0.516 0.563 0.587 
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Table 8 Riskier firms, customer referencing and future performance 
The table presents the results for the moderating effect of a firm’s own risk on the relation between customer 
referencing and future performance. Firm risk is measured by the presence of operating loss in Panel A and the 
extent of financial constraints, i.e., Hadlock and Pierce’s (2010) SA index in Panel B and Whited and Wu’s 
(2006) WW index in Panel C. To investigate whether the product market effect of customer referencing is 
stronger for riskier firms, we interact the customer referencing measure (CUS_REF) with LOSS (indicator for 
operating loss), SA (the SA index) and WW (the WW index), respectively. In each column, the dependent 
variable is one measure of industry-adjusted performance in year t+1: asset turnover (ATO), gross margin (GM), 
selling, general, and administrative expenses (SGA), and return on assets (ROA). All independent variables are 
calculated in year t. Variable definitions are summarized in Appendix C. Firm and year fixed effects are included 
and the t-values in the parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Loss firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ATO GM SGA ROA 
CUS_REF × LOSS 0.042*** 
(3.59) 
0.058*** 
(3.93) 
-0.031*** 
(-2.91) 
0.022*** 
(3.84) 
CUS_REF 0.002 
(0.20) 
0.002 
(0.40) 
-0.000 
(-0.04) 
0.002 
(0.75) 
LOSS -0.218*** 
(-29.96) 
-0.111*** 
(-14.84) 
0.099*** 
(16.06) 
-0.070*** 
(-20.87) 
MAJ_CUS  0.010 
(1.23) 
0.015* 
(1.94) 
-0.015** 
(-2.06) 
0.002 
(0.43) 
CUS_CON -0.056* 
(-1.89) 
-0.335*** 
(-7.25) 
0.092*** 
(2.62) 
-0.074*** 
(-4.58) 
SGRW 0.031*** 
(7.89) 
0.032*** 
(4.95) 
-0.021*** 
(-4.32) 
0.001 
(0.47) 
SIZE -0.369*** 
(-46.18) 
0.004 
(0.65) 
-0.047*** 
(-8.03) 
0.043*** 
(12.56) 
LEV 0.223*** 
(14.45) 
0.045*** 
(2.78) 
0.047*** 
(2.99) 
-0.169*** 
(-15.53) 
CASH -0.835*** 
(-26.68) 
-0.260*** 
(-6.73) 
0.437*** 
(12.52) 
-0.005 
(-0.29) 
TANGI -0.491*** 
(-10.26) 
-0.129*** 
(-2.72) 
-0.050 
(-1.21) 
-0.213*** 
(-9.75) 
SEG 0.018** 
(2.26) 
-0.024*** 
(-3.88) 
-0.001 
(-0.22) 
-0.019*** 
(-5.70) 
AGE -0.091*** 
(-8.22) 
-0.002 
(-0.20) 
-0.016* 
(-1.90) 
-0.005 
(-1.06) 
SGA -0.099*** 
(-14.69) 
0.038** 
(2.54) 
 
 
-0.097*** 
(-16.78) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 98,781 98,781 98,781 98,781 
adj. R2 0.641 0.518 0.565 0.590 
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Table 8 - Cont’d 
 
Panel B. Financially constrained firms (Hadlock and Pierce’s (2010) SA index) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ATO GM SGA ROA 
CUS_REF × SA 0.017* 
(1.90) 
0.017** 
(2.10) 
-0.014** 
(-1.98) 
0.018*** 
(3.93) 
CUS_REF 0.068** 
(2.39) 
0.071*** 
(2.76) 
-0.051** 
(-2.17) 
0.059*** 
(4.05) 
SA 0.202*** 
(6.22) 
-0.036 
(-1.31) 
0.111*** 
(4.68) 
-0.262*** 
(-17.05) 
MAJ_CUS  0.010 
(1.21) 
0.015* 
(1.93) 
-0.015** 
(-2.04) 
0.001 
(0.25) 
CUS_CON -0.041 
(-1.36) 
-0.324*** 
(-6.98) 
0.078** 
(2.20) 
-0.056*** 
(-3.47) 
SGRW 0.041*** 
(10.28) 
0.035*** 
(5.52) 
-0.024*** 
(-4.99) 
0.002 
(0.77) 
SIZE -0.288*** 
(-20.75) 
-0.005 
(-0.42) 
-0.010 
(-1.19) 
-0.050*** 
(-9.28) 
LEV 0.176*** 
(11.37) 
0.038** 
(2.27) 
0.046*** 
(3.00) 
-0.147*** 
(-14.11) 
CASH -0.821*** 
(-25.82) 
-0.261*** 
(-6.67) 
0.445*** 
(12.67) 
-0.018 
(-1.13) 
TANGI -0.544*** 
(-11.23) 
-0.163*** 
(-3.42) 
-0.010 
(-0.25) 
-0.253*** 
(-11.47) 
SEG 0.010 
(1.26) 
-0.026*** 
(-4.16) 
-0.000 
(-0.08) 
-0.017*** 
(-4.92) 
AGE -0.074*** 
(-6.25) 
-0.010 
(-0.99) 
0.001 
(0.13) 
-0.040*** 
(-7.82) 
SGA -0.118*** 
(-17.07) 
0.030** 
(2.02) 
 
 
-0.100*** 
(-17.81) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 98,781 98,781 98,781 98,781 
adj. R2 0.635 0.516 0.564 0.595 
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Table 8 - Cont’d 
 
Panel C. Financially constrained firms (Whited and Wu’s (2006) WW index) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ATO GM SGA ROA 
CUS_REF × WW -0.008 
(-0.13) 
0.153** 
(2.15) 
-0.121** 
(-2.09) 
0.118*** 
(3.55) 
CUS_REF 0.010 
(0.57) 
0.059*** 
(2.83) 
-0.036** 
(-2.08) 
0.032*** 
(3.43) 
WW -0.936*** 
(-9.11) 
-0.982*** 
(-7.35) 
1.172*** 
(9.85) 
-0.807*** 
(-13.04) 
MAJ_CUS  0.009 
(1.08) 
0.015* 
(1.88) 
-0.015** 
(-2.04) 
0.001 
(0.21) 
CUS_CON -0.023 
(-0.74) 
-0.310*** 
(-6.15) 
0.074* 
(1.96) 
-0.045*** 
(-2.83) 
SGRW 0.013** 
(2.20) 
-0.007 
(-0.94) 
0.034*** 
(4.97) 
-0.036*** 
(-9.94) 
SIZE -0.372*** 
(-39.30) 
-0.035*** 
(-3.94) 
0.003 
(0.34) 
0.005 
(1.20) 
LEV 0.200*** 
(12.15) 
0.052*** 
(2.95) 
0.042** 
(2.52) 
-0.138*** 
(-12.14) 
CASH -0.681*** 
(-21.01) 
-0.244*** 
(-5.86) 
0.408*** 
(11.00) 
0.011 
(0.67) 
TANGI -0.485*** 
(-9.57) 
-0.143*** 
(-2.84) 
-0.042 
(-1.00) 
-0.176*** 
(-8.14) 
SEG 0.009 
(1.08) 
-0.027*** 
(-4.30) 
-0.001 
(-0.21) 
-0.016*** 
(-5.19) 
AGE 0.001 
(0.08) 
0.003 
(0.22) 
0.003 
(0.33) 
-0.011** 
(-2.19) 
SGA -0.110*** 
(-15.36) 
0.033* 
(1.90) 
 
 
-0.091*** 
(-14.66) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 90,668 90,668 90,668 90,668 
adj. R2 0.645 0.519 0.569 0.593 
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Table 9 Product market competition, customer referencing and future performance 
The table presents the results of testing the moderating effect of product market competition on the relation 
between customer referencing and future performance. In Panel A, we use the product similarity measure 
introduced by Hoberg and Phillips (2016) as a proxy for product market competition. The sample period for 
Panel A is from 1996 to 2015, as the data for product similarity is only available during this period. In Panel B, 
we use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) calculated based on the annual sales of member firms in each 
industry to measure the extent of product market competition. To investigate whether the product market effect 
of customer referencing is stronger for firms facing higher competition, we interact the customer referencing 
measure (CUS_REF) with SIMILARITY (the product similarity measure) and NEGHHI (negative one times the 
HHI), respectively. In each column, the dependent variable is one measure of industry-adjusted performance in 
year t+1: asset turnover (ATO), gross margin (GM), selling, general, and administrative expenses (SGA), and 
return on assets (ROA). All independent variables are calculated in year t. Variable definitions are summarized in 
Appendix C. Firm and year fixed effects are included and the t-values in the parentheses are based on robust 
standard errors clustered by firm. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Firms with high product similarity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ATO GM SGA ROA 
CUS_REF ×SIMILARITY 0.005*** 
(3.26) 
0.012** 
(2.12) 
-0.000 
(-0.09) 
0.002** 
(2.30) 
CUS_REF -0.009 
(-0.75) 
-0.023 
(-1.25) 
-0.007 
(-0.60) 
-0.004 
(-0.72) 
SIMILARITY 0.004 
(1.60) 
-0.017** 
(-2.25) 
0.001 
(0.26) 
-0.001 
(-0.52) 
MAJ_CUS  -0.002 
(-0.23) 
0.012 
(0.91) 
-0.005 
(-0.45) 
0.000 
(0.08) 
CUS_CON 0.084** 
(1.98) 
-0.231** 
(-2.49) 
0.021 
(0.34) 
-0.012 
(-0.52) 
SGRW 0.041*** 
(7.45) 
0.046*** 
(3.38) 
-0.019** 
(-2.25) 
0.002 
(0.50) 
SIZE -0.352*** 
(-29.87) 
0.021 
(1.39) 
-0.044*** 
(-3.96) 
0.043*** 
(7.22) 
LEV 0.116*** 
(4.81) 
0.143*** 
(3.25) 
0.019 
(0.63) 
-0.095*** 
(-3.90) 
CASH -0.482*** 
(-11.85) 
-0.267*** 
(-3.94) 
0.369*** 
(6.88) 
0.031 
(1.33) 
TANGI -0.229*** 
(-3.25) 
-0.142 
(-1.60) 
0.002 
(0.02) 
-0.162*** 
(-4.17) 
SEG 0.004 
(0.43) 
-0.028*** 
(-3.42) 
0.005 
(0.83) 
-0.015*** 
(-4.14) 
AGE 0.064*** 
(2.88) 
0.032 
(1.05) 
-0.026 
(-1.21) 
0.009 
(0.91) 
SGA -0.077*** 
(-8.84) 
0.048* 
(1.75) 
 
 
-0.067*** 
(-7.56) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 37,584 37,584 37,584 37,584 
adj. R2 0.722 0.561 0.584 0.553 
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Table 9 - Cont’d 
 
Panel B. Firms in an industry with a low HHI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ATO GM SGA ROA 
CUS_REF × NEGHHI -0.028 
(-0.49) 
0.152*** 
(2.77) 
0.014 
(0.33) 
0.051** 
(2.25) 
CUS_REF 0.014 
(1.24) 
0.049*** 
(3.29) 
-0.010 
(-1.03) 
0.019*** 
(3.46) 
NEGHHI 0.191** 
(2.43) 
-0.013 
(-0.33) 
0.002 
(0.04) 
0.052** 
(2.25) 
MAJ_CUS  0.011 
(1.30) 
0.016** 
(2.00) 
-0.016** 
(-2.13) 
0.002 
(0.49) 
CUS_CON -0.036 
(-1.18) 
-0.327*** 
(-7.05) 
0.084** 
(2.36) 
-0.068*** 
(-4.15) 
SGRW 0.040*** 
(9.97) 
0.035*** 
(5.55) 
-0.025*** 
(-5.17) 
0.004 
(1.52) 
SIZE -0.364*** 
(-44.93) 
0.007 
(1.06) 
-0.050*** 
(-8.41) 
0.044*** 
(12.85) 
LEV 0.197*** 
(12.85) 
0.034** 
(2.08) 
0.059*** 
(3.76) 
-0.177*** 
(-16.53) 
CASH -0.832*** 
(-26.09) 
-0.259*** 
(-6.63) 
0.440*** 
(12.51) 
-0.004 
(-0.22) 
TANGI -0.559*** 
(-11.61) 
-0.161*** 
(-3.39) 
-0.018 
(-0.43) 
-0.234*** 
(-10.63) 
SEG 0.013 
(1.58) 
-0.027*** 
(-4.23) 
0.001 
(0.20) 
-0.020*** 
(-6.06) 
AGE -0.101*** 
(-9.04) 
-0.006 
(-0.67) 
-0.012 
(-1.47) 
-0.008* 
(-1.77) 
SGA -0.117*** 
(-17.10) 
0.029** 
(1.99) 
 
 
-0.102*** 
(-17.78) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 98,781 98,781 98,781 98,781 
adj. R2 0.635 0.516 0.563 0.587 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
